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Executive Summary 
1. In the context of poverty reduction strategy paper processes in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
accountability function of supreme audit institutions has increased in importance and 
relevance. Despite the important accountability functions assigned supreme audit institutions, 
little is known about their actual functioning and we have scant information about how SAIs 
interact with other stakeholders in the budget process such as the legislature, civil society and 
donors. This study compares the supreme audit institution in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania. 
It compares the institutional capabilities of the audit institutions, linked to the institutions’ 
mandate, capacity and autonomy. Second, the report assesses the relational resources of 
SAIs, through their interactions with parliament, civil society, and the donor community.  
2. The findings suggest that there are weaknesses in the supreme audit institutions’ mandate in 
Tanzania and Uganda. Executive dominance is a particular threat in the reporting procedures 
in Tanzania as it reports to parliament through the ministry of finance. New legislation has 
increased the scope of auditing and reduced the level of expenditure outside the mandate of 
the supreme audit institution in all three countries. The large amount of expenditure labelled 
‘classified’ and kept outside the jurisdiction of the SAI, is a greater concern in Uganda than in 
Tanzania and Malawi. 
3. Overall, the supreme audit institutions are not able fulfil their assigned tasks due to lack of 
finances, infrastructure and human capacity. Capacity problems have improved in all 
countries by the introduction of integrated financial management systems in the government, 
performance audits and a multiplication of the number of auditees. However, the supreme 
audit institutions have been unable to keep up with the technical development. Initiatives 
within the general framework of the poverty reduction strategy process (i.e. public financial 
management reform) have been centred on government ministries, and audit institutions have 
been sidelined. The rationale behind introducing performance audits in countries struggling to 
carry out the traditional types of audits such as financial and compliance audits, needs to be 
critically examined. At the moment none of the three countries’ audit systems have the 
necessary expertise or financial resources to carry out adequate performance audits. 
4. The audit institutions’ independence is compromised by lack of autonomy in relation to 
appointment and dismissal procedures, financial matters, and access to relevant and timely 
information. The auditor general is appointed by the president in all three countries. Whereas 
the appointment is dependent on the approval of parliament in Uganda and Malawi, this is not 
a requirement in Tanzania. This potentially enhances the presidential leverage over the 
auditor general. In all three cases the president may exert undue influence on the auditor 
general in issues of removal. In practice there is so far no evidence that this has led to 
unwarranted dismissals. The quality of the internal audit within spending units is weak and 
adds to the workload of supreme audit institutions. Internal audit is more developed in 
Tanzania than in Malawi and Uganda. In all countries we note that an insufficient budget 
forces the auditor general to spend time lobbying donors and the ministry of finance for 
money undermining his independence. 
5. As for relational resources, the parliamentary stage of the audit cycle is hampered by lack of 
resources and leverage. Yet, the public accounts committees in Uganda and Tanzania have 
gained a modicum of strength in acting upon the supreme audit institutions’ reports. The 
Malawi public accounts committee is less active. This is in part explained by the support 
given to the committee system. The Malawi public accounts committee is more constrained 
by resource deficits than its Ugandan and Tanzanian counterparts. The relevant Ugandan 
committees perform best in terms of technical assistance and funding. Party (Movement) 
discipline serves as a constraint on the operations of the committees in all three countries and 
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the committees are largely unable to check and ensure that their recommendations are taken 
into account and acted upon. 
6. Lack of cooperation with the media and civil society represents a missed opportunity to 
promote and improve the work of the supreme audit institutions. 
7. Limited donor coordination adds to the workload of the supreme audit institutions, and places 
excessive demands on an already weak institutional capacity. In particular, the interaction 
between the Malawi government and the donors has been problematic. Donor harmonization 
is more developed in Uganda and Tanzania where an increasing amount of donor funds are 
channelled through the budgetary process. The problem with off-budget donor funds going 
straight to ministries remains, making it hard for the audit institutions to keep track of and 
audit these expenditures. This contributes to undermining the authority of the supreme audit 
institutions.  
8. In terms of both institutional capabilities and relational resources, our findings suggest an 
informal ‘ranking’, in which the supreme audit institution in Uganda performs slightly better 
than its Tanzanian counterpart, with the Malawian auditor general lagging behind. The 
National Resistance Movement regime has placed great emphasis on poverty reduction, the 
fight against corruption and herein, oversight institutions. However, moving to a competitive 
and more conflictual political situation, the commitment of the National Resistance 
Movement government to the oversight institutions appears challenged. Overall, the study 
finds that the parliaments, civil society and donors increasingly show commitment to the 
oversight process. But serious problems exist on the follow up side: At the moment there are 
few incentives for the executive to follow up on committee recommendations. There are 
numerous instances of audit findings which have never been acted upon in the three countries. 
The failure to report to statutory deadlines in combination with non-compliance with 
international standards, diminishes the practical relevance of the audit report. Tanzania and 
Uganda have improved their performance with respect to this and outperform Malawi. But the 
same problems are repeated in the reports year after year reflecting lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and incentives to impose sanctions. 
9. This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(Norad). Responsibility for the views expressed and for any errors of fact or judgement 
remains with the authors.  
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1. Introduction  
Ensuring that public resources are spent according to the electoral and administrative mandate; that 
funds are distributed in consistence with stated objectives, and that corruption is avoided, are key 
elements of economic accountability. Supreme audit institutions (SAIs), commonly referred to as 
the auditor general’s office, perform key functions in terms of checking governmental 
accountability over public funds. According to the International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions, auditing is performed in order to ensure 1) the proper and effective use of public funds; 
(2) the development of sound financial management; (3) the proper execution of administrative 
activities; (4) and the communication of information to public authorities and the general public 
through the publication of objective reports.1 
 In the context of poverty reduction strategy processes (PRSPs) in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
accountability function of supreme audit institutions has increased in importance and relevance. The 
PRSP defines targets for resource allocation and outputs through pro-poor budgeting and 
implementation. Public financial management reforms are designed to provide governments with 
sufficient capacity to handle the new forms of aid. Audit institutions are an integral part of these 
processes. SAIs contribute to ensuring commitment to poverty reduction through the budgetary 
process as they audit the funds channelled through the Exchequer system. SAIs thereby serve an 
accountability function both towards its domestic population and donors as an increasing amount of 
aid is provided as budget support. 
 Despite the important accountability functions assigned supreme audit institutions, little is 
known about their actual functioning and we have scant information about how SAIs interact with 
other stakeholders in the budget process such as the legislature, donors and civil society. Against 
this background, this study compares the supreme audit institution in Malawi, Uganda and 
Tanzania. In order to understand how audit institutions function, we first evaluate the institutional 
capabilities of the audit institutions. To do so, we assess the mandate, autonomy and capacity of the 
supreme audit institutions. An adequate mandate, resources and human capacity to carry out the 
given tasks, and independence from the executive are necessary requirements for supreme audit 
institutions to actually perform their accountability function. But, for audit recommendations to be 
translated into effective policy, a supportive environment is required. We therefore proceed to 
analyse the supreme audit institutions’ relational resources i.e. how they interact with other 
institutions and agents in the political system and draw support from the environment.2 In Malawi, 
Uganda and Tanzania parliament, mainly the public accounts committee and similar committees, 
are the primary audience of the supreme audit institutions. The ability of the parliamentary 
committees to hold the executive accountable is in turn influenced by the general political climate 
and the political parties represented in the legislative assembly as well as a vocal civil society. In 
addition, in aid dependent countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, donors exert a 
significant influence on the audit cycle. In order to analyse the actual impact of supreme audit 
institutions in terms of checking the use of state funds, we assess the interactions between SAIs and 
the parliament, civil society, and the donor community.  
 
                                                 
1 According to the Lima Declaration of the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (1977). 
2 This work has benefited greatly from the in -depth comments contributed by Dr. Siri Gloppen. Thanks also to 
the other members of the political scientist group at CMI for useful inputs to previous versions of this report. 
The conceptual framework used in the report is based on the CMI Working Paper “Checking the state. The 
role of special institutions of restraint in Africa’s new democracies” (Gloppen and Rakner, forthcoming).  
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Comparing Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda 
The SAIs are examined in the context of the poverty reduction strategy processes which are ongoing 
in all three countries. These processes provide the basis for assistance from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative, and 
also largely guide the aid provided by the other members of the international aid community (both 
multilaterals and bilaterals). The three countries are at different stages in terms of integrating 
poverty reduction measures into the budget cycle. With a ‘home grown’ PRSP (the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan - PEAP) from 1997, Uganda ranks among the countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa that has come the furthest in implementing poverty reduction strategies. The country has 
adopted the poverty reduction strategy paper as the overarching policy document for the eradication 
of poverty for three budgetary years, and a new PEAP was implemented in 2004. 3 In Tanzania the 
complete PRSP has been in place since October 2000, but the links to the budgetary process are still 
in process of development. Malawi is a ‘latecomer’ in the context of PRSP and did not get a 
complete PRSP until 2002 (Foster et al. 2002). The process suffered from a rushed timetable, and 
the PRSP is still not properly linked to the budget process (Bwalya et al. 2004).  
 The countries also differ with respect to their systems of governance. Uganda stands out with 
its so-called no-party democracy, a system that may be transformed into a multiparty system before 
the March 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections. Both Tanzania and Malawi introduced 
multiparty systems in the early 1990s, but so far no major political shifts have taken place in 
Tanzania. The transition was steered from above under the guidance of the ruling party Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM), and the CCM has enjoyed an overwhelming majority in parliament since the 
first multiparty elections in 1995. In contrast, the three democratic elections in Malawi (1994, 1999 
and 2004) have not resulted in a dominant party system. The United Democratic Front (UDF) 
defeated ‘president for life’ Hastings Banda and the Malawian Congress Party in the first multiparty 
elections in 1994. While UDF has retained power in the two subsequent elections, they have had to 
rely on support from the opposition through various coalitions. This has necessitated negotiations 
with sections of the opposition to facilitate the passing of legislation. 4 
The accountability function of supreme audit institutions in Malawi, Uganda and 
Tanzania 
The analysis utilises a comparative, qualitative case study approach and its findings are based on 
three different sources: Key informant interviews with stakeholders in the budget process in the 
three countries5, government documents and reports.6  
                                                 
3 In general, a country needs to write a PRSP every three years, but changes can be made to the content in the 
annual progress report on the PRSP. 
4 In the parliamentary elections held on 20 May 2004, the UDF experienced a setback. Its presidential 
candidate Bingu wa Mutharika won, but according to the announcement of the Electoral Commission, UDF 
only won 49 of 193 parliamentary seats, a significant reduction from the 91 seats in the 1999 election. In the 
postelection period negotiations with independent MPs and a number of opposition parties, assured UDF a 
working majority in parliament. However, when president Mutharika in Feburary 2005 left UDF to form his 
own party, the Democratic Progressive Party, the position of UDF declined further.  
5 All the interviews in Tanzania and Uganda were conducted in the period from 29 June to 29 July. Altogether 
57 key informant interviews were carried out with policy makers, representatives from the private sector, the 
Government, civil society, and the donor community. The fieldwork in Malawi was carried out during the 
first half of 2004 in relation to two projects neatly tying in with this study – “The institutional context of the 
2004 general elections in Malawi” (CMI/CSR) and “The Political Economy of the Budget Process in Malawi” 
(DFID). Both key informant interviews and focus group discussions were conducted. Numerous people 
helped us during these visits. Deserving of special mention are Donna Bugby-Smith, Martin Wilcox and Carl 
Åke Gerdén.  
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 Our findings suggest that the institutional capabilities of the supreme audit institutions to 
carry out their economic accountability function are limited in all three countries. In terms of 
mandate, the scope of responsibilities (jurisdiction) of the audit raises issues of concern. While now 
de jure comprehensive in each of the countries, it remains to be seen how the audits of classified 
expenditure will transpire in practice. Limited access to information and a considerable part of 
spending categorised as classified expenditure seem to be a greater concern in the case of Uganda 
than in Tanzania and Malawi. The power of the supreme audit institution in Tanzania is 
compromised as it reports to parliament through the ministry of finance, whereas the Uganda and 
Malawi SAIs report directly to parliament. 
 Overall, we have seen that the Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania SAIs are not able to carry out 
their assigned tasks due to lack of resources and capacity. The organizational structure and capacity 
has not been sufficiently adjusted in order to cope with an increased scope of responsibilities and 
the computerization within the governments. Against this background, we question the rationale 
behind introducing performance audits in countries struggling to carry out the traditional types of 
audit such as financial and compliance audits. At the moment none of the three countries’ audit 
systems have the necessary expertise or financial resources to carry out adequate performance 
audits. We note with concern that the SAI’s in all three countries so far have had little or no access 
to the integrated financial management systems schemes which opens up for computerised record 
keeping of transactions for audit purposes. Added to this, the workload of the auditing institutions 
has increased significantly due to the local government reforms and a restructuring of the financial 
framework adding the responsibility of auditing statutory corporations and local authorities. 
Although recent adjustments have taken place within the Malawi SAI it lags behind both Uganda 
and Tanzania in terms of ensuring that its staff receives formal training enabling them to complete 
the audit plan. Overall, the capacity problems appear far greater in Malawi than in Tanzania and 
Uganda. 
 Supreme audit institutions in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania lack autonomy in relation to 
appointment, dismissal, financial matters, human resource management, and access to information. 
The fact that the president appoints the auditor general in all three countries represents a challenge 
to their independence. In the case of Tanzania, the appointment does not even require parliamentary 
approval. In all three cases, the president is able to exert undue influence on the auditor general in 
issues of removal, but the process is somewhat less open to executive influence in Tanzania than in 
Uganda and Malawi. In practice, there is so far no evidence that this has led to unwarranted 
dismissals or unwillingness to renew the auditor general’s contract. The role and functioning of 
internal audits appear more developed in Tanzania than in Malawi and Uganda. Overall, however, 
our findings suggest that internal audits hamper rather than facilitate the work of the supreme audit 
institution. In terms of funding, our findings also suggest that the Tanzanian auditor general enjoys 
more autonomy than its counterpart in Uganda and Malawi. Despite a cash budget system, 
payments are released every six months to the SAI making for a reasonably predictable cash flow. 
In both Uganda and Malawi we observe that payments to the auditor general’s office are habitually 
irregular and less than estimated. In all three cases insufficient budgets have meant that the auditor 
general spends time lobbying donors and the ministry of finance for additional funding, thereby 
subduing the independence of the institution.  
 In terms of relational resources, or the ability of supreme audit institutions to utilise and 
draw support from the environment, the study indicates that the capacity of the legislature to act 
upon the reports of the auditor general varies considerably between the three countries. While the 
relevant parliamentary committees in all cases report that they are constrained by lack of resources 
and leverage, the situation is most alarming in Malawi. The government of Malawi only provides 
funds for plenary sessions. In the last four years, donor support has allowed some committees to 
meet on a regular basis, most notably the budget and finance and public accounts committees. 
                                                                                                                                                     
6 Most of the documents and part of the reports were collected in Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi by the 
authors.  
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While this has improved the oversight function of the legislature, we note that this form of donor 
dependency may create a legitimacy problem as it becomes unclear who the committee really is 
accountable to. 
 The Ugandan parliament and committees appear to be better capacitated to follow up on 
audits. Its oversight committees, particularly the Uganda public accounts committee (PAC), appear 
to have exploited the opportunities to hold the executive accountable to a greater extent than in 
Malawi and Tanzania. An explanation of this may be the considerable openness of committee 
proceedings. PAC sessions are open to the press, officials from the supreme audit institution, the 
accountant general’s office, and the criminal investigation department. The Uganda PAC and to 
some extent the Tanzania PAC, have gained a modicum of strength in acting upon the SAI reports. 
However, party discipline and executive dominance constrain the accountability function of 
parliament in all three countries.  
 Relations to media and civil society  are underdeveloped in all three countries. Neither of the 
SAIs has developed functioning media strategies and relations to civil society are in turn hampered 
by weakly developed media coverage of audit findings. The interactions between SAIs, civil society 
organisations and the media seem best developed in Uganda. We also note that members of the 
public accounts and budget and finance committee of the Malawi parliament emphasised its 
working relationship with civil society in terms of analysis and follow up of audits and the budget 
process.  
 A considerable external engagement in domestic policy processes is witnessed in all three 
cases. Limited donor coordination and off-budget donor funding remain a concern as this 
undermines the budget as a tool to coordinate and determine the distribution of limited resources. 
Our analysis suggests that with respect to the interaction between SAIs and donors, this relationship 
is particularly problematic in Malawi. This is partly due to an inconsistent and turbulent process of 
general budget support. In Tanzania and Uganda donor harmonisation is well developed, with the 
poverty reduction budget support/poverty reduction support credit in Tanzania generally considered 
as particularly well-functioning. The share of direct budget support and support on a “basket” and 
sector-wide basis is increasing especially in Tanzania and Uganda and more projects are registered 
within the medium term expenditure framework.  
 Overall, our study suggests that both aspects of institutional capability and relational 
resources constrain the ability of supreme audit institutions to perform their economic 
accountability function in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. While we find that the parliaments 
increasingly show commitment to the oversight process serious problems exist on the follow up 
side: The legislatures in all three countries are mostly unable to check and ensure that their 
recommendations are taken into account and acted upon. At the moment there are few incentives for 
the executive to follow up on committee recommendations. There are numerous instances of audit 
findings which never have been acted upon in the three countries. The same problems are repeated 
in the reports year after year underscoring the limits of enforcement mechanisms and lack of 
incentives to impose sanctions.  
 Our findings suggest an informal ‘ranking’, in which the supreme audit institution in Uganda 
performs slightly better than its Tanzanian counterpart, with the Malawian auditor general lagging 
behind. However, the Ugandan oversight institutions and functions have been established within the 
movement system, where presumably ‘everyone agreed on the basic principles’. Now moving to a 
competitive and more conflictual political situation, government commitment to the oversight 
institutions is challenged.7 Lately ownership of the poverty reduction agenda is challenged by 
growing politics of patronage (Hickey 2003:10). Piron and Evans (2004:25) point to tackling 
corruption in the public sector as a serious challenge and questions government commitment. Most 
observers of Ugandan politics link the lack of progress in the fight against corruption to the 
                                                 
7 This argument was presented by Andrew Mwenda, The Monitor, at the CMI-Makerere University 
workshop: “The Institutional and Legal Context of the 2005 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in 
Uganda”, Mukono, February 4-6, 2005.  
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upcoming 2006 parliamentary and presidential elections, presenting stakeholders within parliament, 
opposition parties, civil society, and the donor community with several challenging tasks.  
 
*** 
 
 
The study is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, part two presents the main 
characteristics of the Westminster model of audit institutions. In the third section, we assess the 
institutional capability function of SAIs through comparing their mandate, capacity and autonomy 
in the three country cases. Section four examines the impact of the supreme audit institutions on 
actual policy by comparing their relational resources linked to the parliament, civil society, and the 
donor community. The fifth section summarises the findings and compares the overall performance 
of the supreme audit institution in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania.  
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2. The role and function of SAIs  
The SAIs in our three case study countries belong to the Westminster model of external auditing. 
Public external audit are commonly divided into three main types: the Judicial (also referred to as 
the Napoleonic or court of accounts system), the Board and the Westminster (or Anglo-Saxon or 
parliamentary) systems all of which are associated with specific features setting the premises for the 
SAIs functioning.8 
 
Table 1 Overview of types of SAIs and their main characteristics9 
Type of Supreme Audit Institution 
 
Main 
characteristics 
 Judicial system Westminster system  Board system 
Type of audit  Compliance  Financial  Variable 
Prevalence Latin Countries of 
Europe, Turkey, South 
America, Francophone 
and Lusophone Africa  
Commonwealth countries 
(e.g. Malawi, Tanzania and 
Uganda), Denmark, Ireland, 
parts Latin America 
Asian, e.g. Japan, Indonesia 
and Korea. Netherlands, 
Germany, and Argentina  
Organisational 
structure 
Court is integral of the 
judiciary. A judge acts as 
president but members are 
on an equal term 
The SAI an integral part of 
parliamentary oversight. 
Headed by an auditor 
general in a hierarchical 
organisational structure 
Works closely with 
parliament. Headed by a 
president but the board is 
collegiate in nature 
Staff 
qualifications 
Lawyers Accountants and auditors Variable 
Tenure of 
office 
Serve until retirement age Usually term limited but in 
some cases until retirement  
Limited to two terms  
Follow-up of 
audit findings 
The magistrates serving 
on the court impose 
penalties or corrections 
Parliament Parliament 
 
The Westminster system10 is typically marked by SAIs interactions with the parliament. The SAI is 
a core element of parliamentary oversight and there is a close relation between the PAC (and 
equivalent parliamentary committees) that review the audit report and the SAI. The SAI is 
dependent on the parliament to act upon its reports for audits to be effective, implying that with an 
impotent legislature that do not fully discharge its duties the value of the SAIs work is considerably 
reduced. The office of the auditor general has no judicial function itself but its findings may be 
passed on to legal authorities for further action indicating another relational factor determin ing its 
functioning. There are strong safeguards of the tenure of the auditor general and generally s/he can 
only be removed by an act of parliament. The SAI is headed by an auditor general who is personally 
responsible for his or her office, generating a hierarchical organisational structure. The office has a 
professional staff (mostly) with accounting and auditing backgrounds as its traditional focus has 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that these models cover an extensive number of SAIs and there are naturally great intra -
category variations as well as cases of overlap between the three types. Notwithstanding such systematization 
serves as a useful tool of providing an overview of the institutions and constitutes a basis from which 
contrasting characteristics can be pointed out.  
9 For a more detailed outline of these models see DFID (2004).  
10During the colonial period the audit models were transported to new territories and as a result the type of 
SAI in many African countries is closely related to the country’s previous colonial history. The Westminster 
system is, as the name indicates, found in the UK and many Commonwealth countries including countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
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been financial auditing but other types of audit such as compliance and performance audits are also 
carried out by the Westminster type of SAIs (see Box 1).11 The third type of auditing, performance 
audit (or value-for-money12), has become increasingly popular among SAIs since its introduction in 
the 1960s-1970s in many industrialised countries. It represents quite a different approach to auditing 
than compliance and financial auditing and is cost demanding since time and resources must be 
invested in training and building of competence.  
 
 
Box 1 Types of audits 
 
Financial auditing seeks to attest to, or verify the accuracy of the data contained in financial 
statements and reports. The objective is to ensure that the government’s financial statements are 
reliable in the sense that they yield a correct picture of the financial activity and the condition of 
the entity. 
 In compliance auditing the auditor seeks to locate instances of illegal or irregular 
transactions. The purpose is to determine whether the accountable entity has conformed to the 
laws and regulations governing its operations. 
 Performance auditing developed partly in response to a demand from parliamentarians of 
advice on how to increase the efficiency of government and thus obtain better value for the 
taxpayer’s money. A holistic perspective is applied and an entity, program or activity is examined in 
an effort to make sure that administrative procedures adhere to managerialist criteria. This type 
of auditing is therefore tightly knit to the ‘new public management’ tradition and requires different 
skills than the traditional methods of auditing. 
The cycle within the cycle – the audit cycle and the budget cycle 
The budget cycle consists of four stages: (1) the preparation of the budget, (2) the legislative stage 
(deliberation, amendment and formal passage), (3) implementation, and (4) oversight (evaluating 
budget compliance with the stated intentions laid out in the budget), and auditing is part of the 
fourth and final stage. External auditing under the Westminster system is also cyclic in nature (as 
illustrated in a simplified form in figure 1): First the government accounts for the previous financial 
year are prepared by all government departments and public bodies and made available on a 
prearranged time for the SAI to audit. The SAI audits the accounts and produces its report(s) to 
parliament. In parliament the report is referred to the relevant parliamentary committees (most often 
the PAC or equivalent committee). The committees examine and debate the SAI report and 
normally conduct public hearings. Public officials and other relevant parties, including for instance 
SAI staff, civil society representatives, and officials from the ministries and departments are 
summoned to give evidence. When finalised, a report with recommendations and comments are 
handed over to the plenary and debated. Following the plenary stage the report is voted on and 
either rejected or approved. In the event of approval the parliamentary recommendations and 
comments are conveyed to the executive. Throughout, the process is to take place within certain 
timeframes.  
 
                                                 
11 A fourth type of auditing termed ethical audit is a newcomer in the field of audit and has quite recently been 
introduced by SAIs in the UK and Canada. As this type of audit is not practiced in Malawi, Tanzania or 
Uganda it falls outside the scope of this report. The conventional view is that over time these types of audit 
form a comprehensive audit framework that captures the wholeness of an organisation (INTOSAI, Paragraph 
38; Dye and Stapenhurst 1998; Stapenhurst and Titsworth 2001) 
12 ‘Value-for-money-auditing’ refers to the “three Es” i.e. economy  (spending less), efficiency (spending well) 
and effectiveness (spending wisely) (Whener 2002:8).  
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The audit cycle in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania is modelled on this system. In Tanzania, Malawi 
and Uganda the executive is also required to respond to the parliamentary report in the form of a 
treasury memorandum within a fixed date. If the executive decides not to address and act upon a 
certain issue raised in the report this should be accounted for in the treasury memorandum as well 
the measures taken to implement other committee recommendations.  
 
Figure 1 The Westminster audit cycle  
 
 
 
Why and when do supreme audit institutions succeed?  
The degree of independence that audit institutions enjoy is stressed as a cornerstone to a successful 
audit exercise by most authors.13 It is also quite common to use the International Organisation of 
Supreme Audit Institutions’ 1977 Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts as a point 
of departure.14 The latter has become an internationally accepted standard which SAIs generally 
apply as it contains a comprehensive list of all goals and issues relating to government auditing.  
Although the wording and categories used may be different, the literature largely highlights the 
same factors as conducive for successful audit institutions. We analyse the ability of the SAIs in 
Tanzania, Malawi and Uganda to carry out their accountability function on the basis of their 
institutional capabilities i.e. their mandate, capacity, and autonomy. The actual impact of the 
auditing exercise is discussed through comparing the SAIs relational resources; the relationship to 
parliament, media/civil society and the donor community. This analytical framework allows us to 
focus on the relational and dynamic aspects affecting the performance of SAIs. To a larger extent 
than the above listed literature, this analytical perspective is designed to avoid a static focus on 
institutional factors and stress the inter-linkages between SAIs and other actors. It captures the main 
                                                 
13 See for instance Dewar (1988), Stapenhurst and Titsworth (2001) and Dye and Stapenhurst (1998).  
14 See for instance Fiedler (2003) and Wojciechowski et al. (1999).  
Preparation of accounts 
Government accounts 
and financial statements 
audited by SAI. SAI 
prepares report on the 
basis of audits.  
Parliament (relevant 
committee) reviews the 
report and makes its 
recommendations to the 
executive 
Executive considers the 
recommendations and 
decides whether to act 
or not before reporting 
back to parliament 
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points stressed in the literature and at the same time allows us to focus on the functional 
characteristics of the SAIs i.e. to what extent the institutional mechanisms are operative.15  
 A SAI’s mandate refers to its statutory or formal independence as laid down in the legal 
framework such as the constitution, laws, and regulations. The nature of the SAI mandate involves 
who it itself is accountable to and reports to, that is, its cooperative relations (reporting procedures). 
It is also composed of other aspects e.g. scope of responsibilities (are there limits on the scope of 
audit?)  
 The capacity of a SAI refers to both its financial and operational independence. Of relevance 
in this regard are the organisational resources (human resources such as number of staff, 
professional skills and organisational structure), finance (resources at its disposal/overall scale of 
funding), and infrastructure (access to computers, offices, vehicles, travel, training etc.).  
 A SAI’s autonomy is partly a result of a clear mandate and sufficient capacity/resources as all 
the aspects of SAI power is mutually reinforcing (both in a negative or a positive direction). 
Institutional autonomy is here taken to point to the SAI’s ability to fulfil its watchdog role – its 
mandate. It is linked to the resource aspect (sources of funds, security for budgets, and the 
remuneration system of staff) and access to information (getting the necessary information on time 
and when needed). Moreover appointment, tenure and dismissal are factors that must be taken into 
consideration.  
 As a fourth factor, the SAIs relational resources will be looked into. Partakers playing into 
the audit cycle are parliament, donors, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the media. As already 
stressed, the the SAI particularly relies on parliament to be its primary audience. In highly aid 
dependent developing countries the donors are also indirectly and directly involved in the national 
budgetary process. Other actors are the media and CSO’s. Both the media and CSO’s can heighten 
the awareness about audit findings by for instance reporting on PAC debates and recommendations; 
raise issues for the SAI to investigate and even conduct initial investigations into financial 
misconduct or further investigate audit findings; and, assist in building audit literacy in the 
population. Moreover CSO’s can play an active part in the audit process by tracking expenditures, 
measuring program performance, and monitoring the follow-up to the SAI report (Krafchik 2003).  
 
 
                                                 
15 For more on this analytical framework see Gloppen and Rakner (Forthcoming).  
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3. The capability of supreme audit institutions to 
check public finance: Comparing mandate, capacity 
and autonomy  
3.1 Mandate 
The key statute guiding the Malawi SAI is the Public Audit Act No 6 of 2003. In combination with 
other recent statutes such as the Public Finance Management Act No 7 of 2003 and the Public 
Procurement Act No 8 of 2003 it constitutes the legal framework directing the budgeting and public 
financial management functions in Malawi. The legal framework is generally held to be satisfying 
as it is largely based on the country financial accountability assessment guidelines developed by the 
World Bank and Strategic Partnership with Africa donors (Rakner et al. 2004:15). In Tanzania and 
Uganda recent developments regarding the legal framework governing the general financial 
processes including external auditing also have taken place. In Uganda the Public Finance and 
Accountability Act and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act No 1 were adopted in 
2003. A new audit bill intended to strengthen the independence of the Uganda SAI is underway but 
has not been tabled in parliament yet. The Finance Bill of 2001 and the 2001 Public Procurement 
Act16 are the main regulatory statutes in Tanzania. The establishment of the institutions as well as 
aspects concerning their independence are laid down in the constitution in all three countries.  
Reporting procedures 
The SAI in Tanzania submit audit reports to parliament through the ministry of finance (Rutashobya 
2004:22). By not reporting directly to parliament, reporting procedures deviate from international 
standards. The legal framework of the Malawi and Uganda SAIs fulfils this requirement as audit 
reports are submitted to parliament (Muloopa 2003:41; Malawi Public Audit Act 2003, Art. 15). 
However, the scope of responsibilities of the audit raises other issues of concern. The Malawi SAI 
previously could not audit the president, the army, police and the embassies’ accounts (Khembo 
2003:40-41). With the enactment of the 2003 Public Audit Act this has changed and the formal 
framework now allows for comprehensive audits. In Tanzania there is in the words of the auditor 
general “no confidential information where public finance is concerned”.17 This does not mean, 
however, that the audits of the Tanzania SAI in reality cover all government of Tanzania  funds (see, 
Wilcox and Gerdén 2004). It only implies that de jure there are no limits placed on the scope of 
audits. Such limitations represent a way for the executive to by-pass SAI authority.  
 
                                                 
16 A new public procurement bill entered the second reading stage in the Tanzanian parliament on 2 
November 2004. The official parliamentary webpage reports that the grounds for the enactment of the new act 
are that: (a) The central tender board had in the former act (2001) been overwhelmed with a great range of 
powers which had made it susceptible to contravention of the principles of accountability and good 
governance. (b) A need to have a single regulatory body for the overall management of procurement in the 
public sector. (c) A need to establish a mechanism that will oversee public procurement processes and also 
provide for procurement audit. (d) There is a need for the establishment of a public procurement appeals 
authority to cater for settlement of tender disputes (see, www.parliament.go.tz).  
17 Interview Auditor General, Tanzania 06/07/04. 
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The problem of auditing classified expenditure in Uganda 
In Uganda audits have until recently not been comprehensive as they do not cover all government 
expenditure, such as classified expenditure which in practice means expenditures within State 
House, the President’s Office and the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the Uganda SAI has not 
been able to audit the expenditure of institutions that receive a significant amount of supplementary 
funds throughout the year. As an illustration, last budgetary year (Fiscal Year 02/03) the Ministry of 
Defense’s budget allocations were raised significantly and a part of the increase was labelled 
‘classified expenditure’.18 Donors first rejected the budget before entering into negotiations with the 
government. In the end it was agreed that one-two representatives from the donor community 
should get access to the classified accounts to verify and get a grasp of what these expenditures 
actually involve. This arrangement was to start in 2004. 19 With the adoption of the 2003 Public 
Finance and Accountability Act the Uganda SAI is allowed to audit classified expenditure as well, 
but only under specified conditions. Auditors need special authorization and the report will not be 
public, and will not be discussed by the PAC but most likely by a special committee composed of a 
limited number of members.20 No report on classified expenditure has so far been made so how this 
will turn out in practice is still unclear. Still, the question of who should decide whether a subject is 
confidential or not may be raised21. If required, issues relating to national security or other interests 
will be permitted to deviate from the Public Finance and Accountability Act after consultation with 
the secretary to the treasury.22 What amounts to ‘required’ is unclear and although exceptions 
should be consistent with best practice this is problematic as the auditees can be expected to protect 
their own interests and try to restrain the information they provide their auditors. As argued by a 
Ugandan parliamentarian:23  
 
“We must operationalise and categorise [information] so we know what kind of 
information is classified and which information is not. Until now practically 
everything has been classified. Accordingly it does not help much with research 
assistance when there is no access to information”.  
 
Overall, it may be argued that there are weaknesses in the mandate in two of the countries. 
Executive dominance is witnessed in reporting in Tanzania. New legislation has increased the scope 
of auditing and the level of expenditure that is outside the scope of the supreme audit institutions 
has been reduced in all three countries. We will argue that – in terms of formal mandate - the 
problem of access to information and the still large amount of spending categorised as classified 
expenditure seem to be a greater concern in Uganda than in Tanzania and Malawi. In terms of 
organizational resources and infrastructure to carry out the mandate, the overall picture looks 
somewhat different. 
 
                                                 
18 President Museveni announced an increase in defence spending during fiscal year 2002/03 after the budget 
had been approved by parliament which equalled a cut of 23% in non-poverty action fund expenditure (Piron 
and Norton 2004). 
19 Interview donor representatives, Uganda 21/07/04. 
20 The Public Finance and Accountability (Classified Expenditure) Regulations, 2003. 
21 In external auditing it is common to draw a line between secret and politically sensitive subjects, and in the 
case of the former this is decided by parliament. If a subject is considered politically sensitive such as the 
expenses of the head of state the auditor should act with reticence but should in principle have access to all the 
information s/he needs (OECD 1996). In Uganda no distinction is made between secret and politically 
sensitive information and it is a concern that more expenditure than necessary is likely to be subsumed under 
the heading ‘classified expenditure’. 
22 According to Section 8 (2) Public Finance and Accountability (Classified Expenditure) Regulations, 2003. 
23 Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04.  
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Table 2 Summary of findings mandate  
Supreme audit institution Aspects of SAI power 
Tanzania Uganda Malawi  
Mandate Audit reports submitted 
to parliament through 
min of fin. De jure, audits 
are comprehensive 
SAI reports directly to 
parliament. Audits 
comprehensive but 
classified expenditure 
subject to special 
treatment 
Audit reports submitted to 
parliament . Formal 
framework allows for 
comprehensive audits  
Implications There are potential weaknesses in the SAI mandate in Tanzania and Uganda. In 
Tanzania the executive is able to exert undue influence on the SAI in relation to 
reporting. The large amount of expenditure labelled ‘classified’ is a greater 
concern in Uganda than in Tanzania and Malawi.  
3.2 Capacity  
Scale of funding 
For all three countries, it is evident that the scale of funding of the SAIs is inadequate and serves as 
a constraint on their capacity. In Malawi the national assembly is legally empowered to make sure 
the SAI receives sufficient funds to carry out its work. The approved budget is released through the 
Treasury which rather frequently is unable to provide the SAI with the funds the parliament has 
granted it. The budget of the SAI has in fact been decreasing relative to the overall budget of 
Malawi. In 2002 it was noted that the budget (in relative terms) was somewhere around a third of 
what it was seven or eight years ago (Cowater International 2002:40; see also MEJN 2002:1). The 
Malawi Economic Justice Network in its response to the proposed 2004/5 national budget reports 
that the government will still spend more on state residences than on the anti-corruption bureau, 
ombudsman, human rights commission, ministry of justice and the SAI combined. In 2004 the 
funding of the SAI, when considered as a proportion of total government expenditures, has further 
been reduced to approximately one third of what it was five to ten years ago (MEJN 2004:10).  
 As in Malawi, the SAI’s annual budget in Uganda is approved by parliament but the ministry 
of finance controls the actual amount released (OAG 2003:5). The auditor general observes that 
although the workload of the office has increased in terms of number of accounts audited this 
increase in work has not been sufficiently reflected in its budget. The resources allocated to the 
office have in real terms been reduced in the period from 1998 – 2002/3 and in its corporate plan it 
is specifically pointed out that insufficient amounts are spent on non-wage recurrent costs and that 
the ceiling stipulated by the medium term expenditure framework has been the same for several 
years (OAG 2003).  
 In Tanzania  the SAI’s budget is prepared by the ministry of finance and decided by the 
Cabinet. It is thereby the auditee, the executive, that determines the resources provided to the office 
indicating financial dependency. The SAI’s operating budget has been enhanced in recent years to 
enable it to carry out its new roles. The SAI’s recurrent budget increased from Tsh. 1.9 billion in 
fiscal year 2001/02 to 2.6 billion in fiscal year 2002/03 to 4.4 billion in fiscal year 2003/04. Its 
development budget also increased from Tsh. 7.6 million in fiscal year 2002/03 to 9.9 in fiscal year 
2003/04 (Rutashobya 2004:21). Whether this reflects an increase in real terms is, however, unclear.  
Staff and training 
The capacity of the SAI is further hampered in all three countries in terms of their organisational 
resources. On a comparative scale, Malawi has made less progress in ensuring that the staff receives 
formal training in accountancy than in neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda. The major constraint on 
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the SAIs capacity is lack of qualified auditors and although its mandate has been broadened with the 
adoption of the 2003 Public Audit Bill its capacity has not increased significantly (SNAO and 
MNAO 2003:9). In 2002 it was noted that the Malawi SAI was understaffed to the extent that it was 
unable to complete the audits which were meant to be carried out every year (Cowater Internationa l 
2002:57). Currently the office has 300 employees.24 Revealing of the state of affairs at the office is 
the fact that it has only 5 qualified accountants while the Society of Accountants in Malawi, the 
only professional body of accountants in Malawi, had 306 members in March 2004.25  
 The Tanzania SAI has an established staff of 563. At the moment there are, however, only 65 
auditors and 320 examiners in post (Tax 2004:38). The present level of qualified staff is about 5% 
but more staff is about to be hired (PRBS/PRSC Review 2004:52). The office has focused 
extensively on staff training among other things to meet the expanded responsibilities of the office 
laid down in the Public Finance Act No 6 of 2001 (see NAO report 2004). Although the SAI has 
staff with professional qualifications and a few master degree holders mainly in business and 
management, it is in need of people qualified in engineering, procurement and legal issues 
(Rutashobya 2004:21).26  
 The Uganda SAI has also since 1997 made progress in professionalizing the office mainly by 
sponsoring the training of its staff. In 2003 32 of its staff had qualified as professional accountants 
while 75 were at different levels of examination. The office employs a total of 300 audit staff and 
66 administrative and support staff, including 17 qualified accountants and 15 professional 
graduates (OAG 2003:9). All the same the office is still in need of qualified accountants as well as 
lawyers in order to carry out the required audits.27  
 According to the Ugandan auditor general the SAI has so far not experienced a lot of turnover 
of staff but he foresees that as more and more of his staff become qualified and gain experience this 
will become a problem. 28 The Malawi and Tanzania SAIs have had problems retaining employees 
over the years and this is still a source of concern (Cowater International 2002:5; SNAO and 
MNAO 2003)29. Although the situation has improved the staff at the Tanzania SAI point out that it 
is a problem that the SAI cannot offer competitive terms of service.30  
 From the above it is clear that financial and human constraints hinder all three SAIs in 
effectively completing their audits, but particularly the Malawi SAI has been unable to offer staff 
the necessary formal training. In addition there are also other challenges facing the SAIs. More 
specifically an integrated financial management system has been introduced in central (and local) 
governments whereas the SAIs have not had the opportunity to keep pace with the development. In 
addition performance audits have been introduced and there has been a general increase in the 
number of entities required to be audited mainly as a result of local government reforms. All of 
which could imply a need to modify the organizational structure to a changing environment.  
Access to technical equipment 
Weaknesses in the SAIs operations may be demonstrated in relation to basic facilities like access to 
computers, offices, vehicles, and travel which are all lacking. An integrated financial management 
system (IFMS) has been launched in government ministries and departments in Tanzania, Malawi 
and Uganda and the computerised accounting developments will only increase in the years to come. 
A common denominator is that the SAIs in all three countries have been unable to keep up with this 
progress in technical development and so far has had little or no access to the IFMS which opens up 
                                                 
24 Interview Auditor General, Malawi 17/03/04. 
25 Interview Society of Accountants personnel , Malawi 19/03/04.  
26 See also interview Auditor General, Tanzania 06/07/04. 
27 Interview Auditor General, Uganda 14/07/04. 
28 Interview Auditor General, Uganda 14/07/04. 
29 Interview SAI official, Tanzania 02/07/04; Interview SAI official Tanzania 02/07/04. 
30 Interview SAI official Tanzania 02/07/04; Interview SAI official Tanzania 02/07/04. 
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for computerised record keeping of transactions for audit purposes. In Malawi the government has 
purchased and is implementing IFMS under the financial management, transparency and 
accountability project.31 By mid-2002 pilots at five sites in three ministries had been carried out, 
implementation in other ministries was near readiness and capacity building was ongoing (WB 
2002). Since then the progress in implementing the project has slowed down. While it set out to 
target improved financial management, support to accountability institutions was also on the agenda 
and the SAI received technical support in the form of computers. The project also aimed at 
strengthening the accounting profession in the public sector as such (SNAO and MNAO 2003:7). 
The Tanzania  SAI is fully aware of the challenges that lie ahead and have even moved offices to 
better be able to follow the technical development. In a 2003 baseline study of the Tanzania SAI it 
was reported that “All audit staff expressed concern that while the auditees are rapidly moving 
towards Computer Information System environment, they had virtually no experience using basic 
IT software or Audit software” (SNAO 2003:12). The Uganda SAI also struggles with poor 
operational logistics. The SAI has 10 regional offices where half of the office’s technical staff is 
employed and the auditor general calls for a centralized database that links the headquarters with the 
branch offices to ease information sharing and better manage the collected data. The office started 
an IT training program in 1999 and the SAI recognizes the need to continue this effort as the 
government of Uganda introduced the IFMS both at the central and local government from July 
2003 onwards. Overall, accommodation, equipment, and transport are either not available or in 
short supply. The office has at its disposal 33 computers, 22 motor vehicles and 31 motorcycles 
(OAG 2003:4, 24). In this regard it is better off than the Malawi and Tanzania SAIs.  
 The IFMS has been part of the public financial reforms in the three countries illustrating that 
some of the initiatives within the general framework of the PRSP have largely ignored the SAIs and 
thus contributed to marginalise them.  
The added responsibilities of performance audits 
The issue of capacity and performance audit skills now constitutes a pressing need in the three 
countries. Performance audits were not taken into account when the institutional structure was 
established in any of the countries. The added responsibility of carrying out performance audits 
have recently been introduced in Malawi (the 2003 Public Audit Bill). A performance audit office 
and a parastatal audit section have been established within the SAI in order to better fulfil its new 
functions added in the 2003 Public Audit Act. The Malawi SAI’s institutional framework is still 
being revised after the public audit bill was passed in May 2003 and it is yet too early to see the 
effect of the restructuring. However, at the moment the performance audit section only has two 
employees and no performance audits have been carried out so far. In Tanzania performance audits 
were included in the office’s responsibilities in 2001, but the staff skills are still too limited to carry 
out performance audits of a good professional standard and the institutional development is 
inadequate (Wilcox and Gerden 2004). A performance audit mandate was added to the duties of the 
Uganda SAI in 1995. By September 2003 only one full performance audit had been carried out in 
Uganda due to lack of skills and resources (OAG 2003: 20). The Uganda auditor general comments 
that: 
 
 “I cannot fulfil my Constitutional mandate as I cannot hire the required expertise to 
help carry out these specialised audits, coupled by the fact that I remain financially 
                                                 
31 The financial management, transparency and accountability project focuses primarily on two of the pillars 
included in the Malawi PRSP, human capital development and promoting good governance. Its main 
components are strengthening accountability institutions, improving financial management systems and 
enhancing human capital development (WB 2002). The Malawi SAI no longer receives funding from this 
project.  
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constrained to operate within the ceiling placed by the medium term expenditure 
framework of Government” (OAG Report 2004:viii).  
The challenge of local government reform on the capacity of SAIs 
The workload of the SAIs has been steadily augmented in the wake of local government reforms 
and a restructuring of the financial framework. This has added to the responsibility of auditing 
statutory corporations and local authorities. Since 1996 (the Local Government Act was enacted in 
1995) re-organisations and the creation of additional local authorities in Uganda have multiplied the 
number of auditees. Currently there are 10 regional offices which are responsible for approximately 
5 districts each. The number of districts has been raised from 45 to 56 in only a few years. The 
districts also have town/city councils which are considered separate entities. Municipal councils and 
sub-counties also have to be audited. The latter now number approximately 900 (OAG 2003:18). 
This increase in accounts that require audit has underscored the capacity problems within the office 
and this is also the reason why, as indicated by the director of audit (local governments): “we have 
been unable to audit sub-counties which now number over 900 and we have had to rely on capacity 
building from the ministry of local government and the World Bank and these have to some extent 
relieved our effort but the problem remains, it is still there”.32 Lack of appropriate accounting skills 
at the local level are also part of the reason why these accounts have been difficult to audit. For the 
financial year 2000/01 only 113 sub-counties managed to produce accounts that could be audited 
(OAG 2003:14) while in 2002/03 336 sub-county accounts were audited. At the moment the 
Uganda SAI audit 65 statutory corporations (UNAO 2004: viii).  
 
Since 1999, Tanzania has actively pursued local government reforms. The new Local Government 
Act was approved by parliament in February 1999. In October 1998 there were 111 local authorities 
in Tanzania (Fjeldstad 2001:3) while there are 119 Local Authorities (including district councils, 
town councils, municipal councils, and city councils) today thus the overall amount of external 
audit has increased considerably. As argued by the Tanzanian auditor general: 
  
“There is a local government reform going on and what is more a lot of the donor 
community funds are channelled straight to the local government authorities. Now 
with a weak financial management system it is quite difficult for us to know what is 
happening in the local authorities. We are talking about 120 local governments, 
there are municipalities, district councils and city councils …”.33 
 
Irregularities in district council accounts are frequent and are also pointed out in the SAI reports, but 
the situation seems to be improving. A recent study of the local government finances in six 
Tanzanian councils noted that more councils were given a ‘clean certificate’ in the last audit report 
than what has been the case before. However, it is unclear whether this is coincidental or a trend 
(Fjeldstad et al. 2004: 16-17). A study by DAIMA Associates and the Overseas Development 
Institute also observes a positive trend in local authorities’ financial management (DAIMA and ODI 
2004).  
 Malawi mirrors the Tanzanian and Ugandan development. In 1994 the local authorities’ level 
of administration was abolished. A new decentralization policy was agreed on in 1998 and 
following this a Local Government Act was enacted. This was the start of a 10 year program for 
decentralization and local authorities were reintroduced in 2000 (Khembo 2003; Hussein 2003), 
dramatically increasing the number of accounts to audit. At the moment Malawi has 28 
administrative districts (Malawi Electoral Commission 2004) which all should be audited. The SAI 
was also mandated to audit parastatal accounts with the enactment of the 2003 Public Audit Act 
                                                 
32 Interview SAI official, Uganda 14/07/04. 
33 Interview Auditor General, Tanzania 06/07/04. 
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(Article 6 (2)). Combined this has considerably added to the workload of the SAI. Financial 
indiscretions at the local level are prevalent and cases of misallocation of funds, financial 
mismanagement, and corrupt practices are reported. Several local governments have for instance 
been accused of diverting funds intended for development and spending them on ruling party 
(United Democratic Front) election campaigns (Khembo 2004:81). Most councilors have poor 
understanding of policy issues relating to finances and there is a general shortage of qualified staff 
in rural district assemblies, especially in financial management and accounting, and a lack of 
effective internal financial controls and auditing (Hussein 2003: 278-280). The situation is 
exacerbated by the shortfall in external auditing. At the moment the SAI simply does not have 
enough funding and capacity to cover all districts. The auditor general informs that: “Due to 
inadequate funding and capacity constraints the SAI has carried out few audits of [local 
government] assemblies”.34  
 With the enactment of the 2003 Public Audit Act (Article 6 (2)) the audit of parastatals also 
falls within the mandate of the Malawi SAI. In Tanzania the audits previously carried out by the 
Tanzania Audit Corporation (i.e audits of parastatals) are also set to be transferred to the SAI. This 
development further contributes to widen the responsibility of the institutions. In Uganda the audit 
of 65 statutory corporations is already the responsibility of the SAI (UNAO 2004:viii). The audit of 
parastatals was defined as the responsibility of the SAI already in the 1995 Constitution. 
 
Table 3 Overview of increase in auditees 
Increase in auditees* Tanzania Uganda  Malawi  
Local gov. Increase from 111 in 
1998 to 119 today 
From 45 in 1996 to 56 
districts today 
28 districts from 2000 
Parastatals  To be handed over to 
SAI. 
65 statutory 
corporations 
Handed over in 2003. 
Number unclear. 
* Note that the numbers exclude the increase in sub-units that also should be audited 
 
The ability to outsource audits in for instance executive agencies may help to relieve the additional 
workload of the SAIs. In Tanzania this has contributed to more timely audit reports (PRBS/PRSC 
Review 2004:50). The Malawi and Uganda SAIs are also empowered to contract out audits in order 
to ensure that its responsibilities are been carried out efficiently (see, Public Audit Act 2003 Article 
10 (2); Public Finance Act 2003 Article 34 (1b)). The extent to which this actually takes place is not 
clear, but there are indications that this is a solution that is opted for rather frequently. The director 
of project audit and administration at the SAI in Uganda explains that the SAI contracts out audit 
“because at the moment we are so few people on the ground. Most often we audit the central 
government accounts ourselves because this is an area where we are competent. Private audit firms 
are used in relation to local government accounts and parastatals”.35 All the same, contracting out is 
expensive and is at times impossible unless for instance a project has a budget earmarked for audit 
(Muloopa 2003:42). In Malawi only audits of parastatals and donor funded projects are sometimes 
outsourced.  
 In terms of finances, infrastructure and human capacity, our analysis suggests that the SAIs in 
Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania all struggle to fulfill their assigned tasks, and the challenges lying 
ahead have only increased with the introduction of IFMS, performance audits and local government 
reforms. The Malawi SAI particularly lags behind in ensuring that the staff receives formal training 
and completing its audit plan, while the Uganda SAI has better basic facilities than the Malawi and 
Tanzania SAIs. The rationale behind introducing performance audits in countries struggling to carry 
out the traditional types of audit such as financial and compliance audits, should be critically 
examined. At the moment none of the three countries’ audit systems have the necessary expertise or 
financial resources to carry out adequate performance audits.  
                                                 
34 Interview Auditor General, Malawi 17/03/04. 
35 Interview SAI official, Uganda 14/07/2004. 
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Table 4 Summary of findings capacity 
Supreme audit institution Aspects of SAI power 
Tanzania Uganda Malawi  
Capacity Suffers from lack of 
funding, budget decided 
by cabinet. Staff training 
emphasised, but lack 
qualified staff. 
Organizational structure 
and capacity not 
sufficiently adjusted to 
cope with increased 
scope of accounts to 
audit, computerisation 
within govt. and added 
responsibility of 
performance audits.  
Parliament approves 
budget but min of fin 
controls amount released. 
Increase in workload not 
reflected in budget. 
Despite progress in 
professionalizing staff 
still lacking qualified 
personnel. Technical 
equipment relatively 
good. Capacity 
challenged by technical 
development within govt., 
local govt reforms, 
performance audits. 
Inadequate overall 
funding. Parliament 
approves budget but 
min of fin releases less 
than granted by 
parliament. Less 
progress than Tanzania 
and Uganda in ensuring 
training of staff. SAI 
not able to keep pace 
with technical 
development in 
government, added 
responsibility of 
performance audits, and 
increased number of 
accounts to audit.  
Implications SAIs not able fulfil their assigned tasks due to lack of finances, infrastructure and 
human capacity. Malawi SAI lags behind in ensuring formal training of staff. 
Challenges exacerbated by introduction of IFMS in government, performance 
audits and a multiplication of auditees in all three countries. IFMS capacity 
building has been centred on government ministries and SAIs have been 
sidelined. Introduction of performance audits should be critically examined as the 
three countries’ audit systems lack the expertise and resources to carry it out. 
3.3 Autonomy 
The SAIs’ autonomy refers to the extent to which they are able to carry out their mandate without 
any interference. Critical factors include appointment, tenure, independent sources of funding and 
access to information. In part the observed capacity problem facing the national audit institutions 
may relate to limited political will to give priority and adequate funding to these important 
watchdog institutions.  
 Our findings suggest that in all cases the president potentially is able to exert undue influence 
on the auditor general in issues of appointment and removal, all though with respect to the latter 
perhaps less so in Tanzania than in Uganda and Malawi. In practice there is so far no evidence that 
this has led to unwarranted dismissals in any of the countries. Moreover, payments to SAIs are 
habitually delayed, irregular and every so often less than what has been estimated. In the cash 
budgeting systems operating in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania, funds are allocated the public 
institutions according to revenue collections and disbursed by the Treasury (i.e. the executive). The 
Uganda and Malawi SAIs are subject to monthly disbursements, while the Tanzania SAI is in a 
more privileged position as money is released on a half year basis making it easier to plan ahead. 
The 2001 Public Finance Act secured the SAI greater security of budget as the money appropriated 
by parliament is paid into an audit revenue fund which is controlled by the Tanzania SAI. While 
secured greater budgetary consistency, the Tanzania SAI is financially dependent in the sense that it 
is subject to the budget ceilings set by the executive. This is also the case in Malawi and Uganda. 
The problem with receiving less funding than budgeted remains in Malawi and Uganda (Rakner et 
al. 2004; Khembo 2003; OAG 2003). The Malawi auditor general complains that cash budgeting 
makes its funding so unpredictable that it “actually means that planning is irrelevant. What we do 
depend on is what comes in [in terms of funds] that month”.36 
                                                 
36 Interview Auditor General, Malawi 17/03/04. 
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 The Uganda SAI has to seek permission from the ministry of finance37 if re-allocations of 
funds are necessary. The proposed auditor general’s bill (which is still pending with the ministry of 
finance) stipulates that parliament through an appointment board should review the plans and 
annual estimates of the office to secure greater budgetary independence (OAG 2003:5, 7). Budget 
cuts may also come in the form of supplementaries.  
The Uganda auditor general elaborates:  
 
“the problem is that it is not very easy to organise on a monthly basis. You may find 
that you have to do a special audit somewhere and you need a lot of money up front 
to get staff out and you cannot exactly say that ‘I am going to portion part of my 
staff out for the next three months’”.38  
Appointment and tenure 
In Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania, the auditor general is appointed by the president posing a 
challenge to their independence. Whereas the appointments are depend on the approval of the 
national assembly in Malawi and Uganda, such an approval is not even a requirement in Tanzania.  
 In Malawi and Uganda the auditor general serves on 5 year contracts which can be renewed 
once, while in Tanzania the auditor general serves until reaching the retirement age. The Tanzanian 
model in principle provides the best security of tenure. However, a problem may occur if the person 
in office turns out not to be of high moral standard and integrity. Serving on contracts as in the case 
of the auditor general in Uganda and Malawi may act as a safeguard against this. But, the two-term 
model may create a window of opportunity for the executive to exert undue influence, especially at 
the time of renewal of the contract. This concern was raised by the Uganda auditor general, (whose 
contract is about to expire): 
 
“It would impact on ones independence during the appointment time if for example 
one was to enter into a conflict with the government and obviously the question that 
can be raised is the perception. It is a very important issue because the government 
can say that ‘no we do not interfere’ but the question is whether I am perceived to 
be impartial in my judgment if the government have the legal right to renew my 
contract”.39  
 
In this perspective a single, non-renewable term is favourable. But the tenure arrangements 
inevitably face a trade-off between independence, continuity, and the need to “guard the 
guardians”.  
 In Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi40 the grounds for removal of the auditor general are quite 
similar and include incompetence, misbehaviour and inability to perform the duties of the office.41 
Parliamentary approval to dismiss the auditor general is not needed in any of the countries. In 
Tanzania a special tribunal appointed by the president investigates the matter and then advices him 
on whether to remove the auditor general or not. In Malawi and Uganda what amounts to 
misconduct and incompetence is solely at the discretion of the president. This poses a serious 
challenge to the independence of the SAIs in all the three countries, although perhaps to a lesser 
                                                 
37 I.e. the Uganda Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, but will be referred to as the 
Ministry of Finance in the text.  
38 Interview Auditor General, Uganda 14/07/04. 
39 Interview Auditor General, Uganda 14/07/04. 
40 In Malawi the Public Appointments Committee is entitled to at any time enquire into the competence and 
financial probity of the person appointed auditor general. 
41 See Article 144 Tanzania Constitution, Article 163 (10)Uganda Constitution, and Article 184 (6) Malawi 
Constitution 
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extent in Tanzania than in the two other countries. The effect of this hidden threat should, however, 
not be underestimated although so far there are no examples of unwarranted dismissals.  
Budget constraints jeopardising autonomy of audit institutions 
Auditor generals may either passively accept the limited resources or actively pursue alternative 
sources of funding. The Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi SAIs have opted for the latter strategy and 
spend time solicit donors and the Treasury for money. However, the auditor generals’ vigorousness 
also makes them susceptible to the informal sphere of politics, risking the independence of the audit 
office. The Malawi auditor general revealed that he habitually pleaded with the ministry of finance 
and then he often got more.42 The Tanzania auditor general claimed that as the relevant 
parliamentary committee will normally not raise the ceiling accordingly it is more profitable to 
target the donors.  
 
“Personally I would plead to the ambassador of Sweden, I really pleaded with him. 
You cannot do this work on behalf of parliament if you are not up to the same 
standard [of computerisation]. It is impossible. So it is better to take it into your 
own hands”.43  
Access to relevant information 
The autonomy of the SAI is further indicated by whether it has access to the relevant information – 
and on time.44 The functioning and quality of the internal audit (IA) within spending units is of 
relevance since there is tight interplay between the SAI and the IA – they both have central roles to 
play in enhancing public financial accountability. A weak IA adds to the workload of the SAI and 
diminishes the effect of external audit. It further may lead to inadequate follow up of audit findings 
as recommendations and corrective actions are not taken by the auditees, thus rendering the 
recommendations the SAI reports superfluous.  
 Starting with the latter the IA in all three countries requires considerable strengthening. 
Tanzania has in fact made some progress in IA as audit committees45 have been instituted in all 
ministries, departments and agencies to function as a support mechanism for accounting officers 
(PRBS/PRSC Review 2004:15), and the ministry of finance through the accountant general’s 
department has IA offices in all ministries (Rutashobya 2004:23).46 The formal framework has been 
reinforced and contrary to Uganda and Malawi IA is a statutory obligation in Tanzania. A new IA 
manual was just made and training of staff has started.47 The impact of the committees is not yet 
clear as they are newly established, but a review of the functioning of three such committees is to be 
undertaken by the ministry of finance in the near future (PRBS/PRSC Review 2004:52). 
Notwithstanding, the ineffectiveness and low quality of the internal audit system is frequently 
underlined (WB 2004; Simpson 2004; Rutashobya 2004). The Tanzania auditor general is not 
impressed “Internal audit is not there. If internal audit was there then our work would be easier, 
because then we could depend on them. Practically, internal audit is not there, it is not there”.48  
 The Malawi government as well as donors recognize the need to improve the internal audit 
function in the country (see, SNAO and MNAO project document 2003:8). Our interviews in 
                                                 
42 Interview Auditor General, Malawi 17/03/04 
43 Interview Auditor General, Tanzania 06/07/04. 
44 Its interactions with donors and parliament are discussed in the last part of the report.  
45 The committees consis t of 3-5 people. At least one should not be an employee of the institution under audit 
(PRBS/ PRSC Review 2004:15). 
46 Also interview official, Office of the President, Tanzania 30/06/04. 
47 Interview senior ministry of finance official, Tanzania 01/07/04. 
48 Interview Auditor General, Tanzania 06/07/04.  
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Malawi suggest that IA is of limited value as IA reports are not taken into account by controlling 
officers. IA has since 2003 been situated in the Office of the President and Cabinet but is not 
statutory. The controlling officers hand the IA reports over to the Treasury for action and to the SAI 
for follow up. The Secretary to the President in Cabinet is empowered to take managerial 
disciplinary action but appears unwilling to effect sanctions. This basically means that little or no 
action is taken as the Treasury only can offer advice which the controlling officer is not obliged to 
take (Rakner et al. 2004:15). The director of IA laments that “since 2000 none of the audit reports 
written to permanent secretaries have been responded to”.49  
 The IA function in Uganda is relatively new. It was established in 1997 and is statutory for 
local governments but not for government ministries. There are IA teams in all ministries and the IA 
has recently begun to produce reports and as part of the 2003 Public Finance and Accountability 
Law a system of audit committees is to be introduced. The audit committees are to assist accounting 
officers in fulfilling their duties as designated to them by the secretary to the Treasury (MOFPED 
2002). The system was scheduled to be implemented from 1 July 2004. Only 2-3 committees are to 
be established at first and will have to deal with several ministries while the old system is phased 
out. As in the other two countries the IA is not sufficiently funded and thinly staffed. A ministry of 
finance official openly states that “As it is now it is not easy to see whether they [IA] do their job. 
So far there has been no way to control. The IA reports do come but not always”.50  
Delayed accounts hinders the independent reporting of SAIs 
Late releases of accounts contribute to constrain and delay the work of the SAIs. The statutory 
national financial reporting deadline repeatedly is not met in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania. The 
Malawi ministries and departments have not been timely in submitting their financial statements 
(Cowater International 2002:57; SNAO and MNAO 2003). Each controlling officer is supposed to 
respond to the auditor general’s queries but the SAI hardly ever receives the responses. The reports 
are therefore delayed and the SAI has no punitive measures available when this takes place. In 
Uganda the auditor general and his staff time and again run into difficulties in accessing the 
necessary information and documentation so that the national audit report can be completed on 
time. The auditor general calls for legislative changes in order to better secure the right of access to 
information (OAG 2003:7). For fiscal year 2002/03 24 out of 65 statutory corporations audits were 
not completed or handled because the management had not submitted their financial statements on 
time. The local government audits had not been completed in March 2004 due to non-submission or 
late submission of accounts (UNAO 2004:viii). In Tanzania a gradual improvement has taken place 
as accounts, especially central government accounts, now are available on time. But as argued by 
the Tanzania assistant auditor general: 
 
“The required documents are normally available except those that are problematic 
and this is normally those who are not properly vouched for and go into the 
corruption process. Normally we have quite a number of documents like this”.51  
 
The analysis of the institutional capabilities of the SAIs in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania indicates 
that there are significant shortcomings both in terms of the mandate, capacity and autonomy of the 
audit institutions. New regulations have increased the jurisdiction of audits in all countries. 
Furthermore, some efforts to increase the capacity of the institutions have been witnessed. But the 
combination of increasing tasks related to performance audits and local government reforms and the 
lack of priority to the SAIs in the budget weaken the overall capacity of the audit institutions. 
Insufficient budgets force the auditor generals to spend time lobbying donors and the ministry of 
                                                 
49 Interview official, Office of the President and Cabinet, Malawi 16/03/04. 
50 Interview ministry of finance official, Uganda 16/07/04.  
51 Interview SAI official, Tanzania 02/07/04. 
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finance for additional funding subduing the independence of the office. Lack of access to timely 
information further undermines the SAIs’ autonomy and it may be argued that internal audit offices 
in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda at the moment hamper rather than facilitate the work of the SAIs.  
 
Table 5 Summary of findings autonomy 
Supreme audit institution Aspects of SAI power 
Tanzania Uganda Malawi  
Autonomy  AG appointed by 
president. Serves until 
retirement age. Tribunal 
appointed by president 
investigates matters of 
removal. President 
obliged to act on advice. 
Payments released every 
six months. More 
predictable cash flow than 
in Uganda and Malawi. 
AG spends time lobbying 
for more funding due to 
insufficient budget. IA 
needs strengthening. 
Audit committees in all 
min, dep and agencies. IA 
statutory. Central 
government accounts on 
time. Local government 
accounts often delayed.  
AG appointed by 
president. Serves on 5 yr 
contracts. Grounds for 
removal at discretion of 
president. Monthly 
disbursements of funds. 
Payments often less than 
estimated and delayed. 
Depend on min of fin for 
re-allocations. Spends 
time soliciting additional 
funds. IA needs 
strengthening - statutory 
for local government, not 
central. Audit 
committees to be 
introduced. Central 
government accounts on 
time, local government 
and parastatal accounts 
often late.  
AG appointed by 
president upon approval 
of parliament. Serves on 
5 yr contracts. Grounds 
for removal at discretion 
of president. Monthly 
disbursements of funds. 
Disbursements 
unpredictable, irregular 
and often less than 
budgeted. AG petitions 
donors and min of fin for 
more funding. IA in dire 
need of strengthening 
and not statutory. 
Submission of 
consolidated accounts 
from Accountant 
General’s office not 
timely.   
Implications Autonomy compromised by appointment procedures, insecurity of tenure, 
financial matters, and access to relevant and timely information. Presidents may 
exert undue influence on SAI in issues of appointment and removal. With respect 
to the latter perhaps less so in Tanzania than in Uganda and Malawi. IA hampers 
rather than facilitates the work of the SAIs but is seemingly more developed in 
Tanzania than in Malawi and Uganda. In terms of funding the Tanzanian SAI 
enjoys more autonomy than its counterparts  in Uganda and Tanzania. In all 
countries, insufficient budgets force the SAIs to lobbying donors and the min of 
fin, impacting on its independence.  
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4. The impact of supreme audit institutions: The 
relationship to parliament, civil society and the 
donor community  
To ensure that audit recommendations are translated into effective policy and behavioural change its 
relational resources are crucial. Within the Westminster audit system and parliament, mainly the 
public accounts committee (PAC), is the primary audience of the SAIs. The ability of the 
parliamentary committees to hold the executive accountable is in turn influenced by the general 
political climate and the political parties represented in the legislative assembly as well as a vocal 
civil society. Public confidence in the SAI and its findings is also important in this regard. In 
addition, donors exert a significant influence on the audit cycle.  
4.1 Interactions with parliament  
The relationship between the SAI and parliament in the Westminster system is characterised by 
symbiosis. Parliament needs informative and high quality audit reports to fulfil its function of 
ensuring that spending complies with the parliament’s expectations and standards and that policy 
has been carried out effectively, efficiently and economically. The SAI needs the parliament to 
bring about changes and hold the executive accountable - unless the audit findings are followed up 
and acted upon the problems will persist. Each of the case study countries has a PAC to scrutinize 
government ministries and departments. In Tanzania and Uganda separate committees have been 
assigned the task of dealing with the audit reports on local government accounts. Uganda is the only 
country in which a special committee has been established to examine the audited accounts of 
publicly owned companies (parastatals). All of the committees involved in scrutinising the auditor 
generals’ reports in the three countries are according to the legal framework empowered to summon 
officials to stand before them (conduct hearings) and all of them habitually exercise their right to do 
so. Nonetheless there are considerable differences in the way they are functioning.  
The relative strength of the legislatures in acting upon SAI reports 
The PAC of the Uganda parliament has summoned various departmental accounting officers and 
ministers to stand before it and has on occasions even locked accounting officers up in the 
parliamentary cell for showing contempt of the committee (Muloopa 2003: 41).52 The local 
authorities accounts committee53 (LAAC) and the committee on state enterprises have been less 
effective and visible in their work. This is partly explained by the fact that these are recent 
establishments being formed when the 7th parliament (2001-2006) was inaugurated.  
 In parallel to the Uganda PAC the Tanzania PAC has been complimented for its will to act, 
perhaps increasingly so under the leadership of Hamad Rashid Mohamed (Civic United Front). The 
latter is surprising as Mohamed is the only presidential appointee from the opposition. The LAAC is 
less high profile than the PAC but both committees commonly call people to stand before them. The 
                                                 
52 The Nakasongola district chief administrative officer was imprisoned for not bringing the necessary 
documentation when summoned to stand before the committee. He was released after 8 hours and instructed 
to bring sufficient information the next day (Muloopa 2003). A member of the public accounts committee 
asserts that “we [the PAC] are very hard and everybody quivers when they have to stand before us” (Interview 
MP, Uganda 19/07/04).  
53 In Uganda the official name is the committee on local government accounts, but the committee will here be 
referred to as the local authorities accounts committee.  
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deputy chair of the LAAC underscores that “The committees [the PAC and the LAAC] can summon 
anybody to answer questions so that the parliament can work well. The accounting officers, that is 
the permanent secretaries, are most often called as well as the district executive officers, that is the 
accounting officers in the districts”.54 According to Rutashobya (2004) the committees have gained 
a modicum of strength in matters of oversight. On a more negative note there are several 
mechanisms constraining the committees’ oversight function. The director of a parliamentary 
technical support program comments that, 
 
“Due to the strong history of one-party rule and the strong one-party system…….. 
MPs are not sure of their own role and are not sure of how far they can push. They 
are aware but not of the scope and breath of oversight”.55  
 
The Malawi PAC is not as active and high profiled as its Tanzania and Uganda counterparts but do 
call officers to stand before it. The committee meets infrequently and on an irregular basis, limiting 
its activity. Its lack of vigour is also related to the fact that four years ago there was no functioning 
committee system in the Malawi national assembly, in practice meaning that the legislature was 
unable to perform any oversight function on the executive. Despite unfavourable working 
conditions, the PAC of the Malawi parliament has examined cases of top-level corruption. 
Indicating the level of executive dominance, the committee chair (from the opposition party Malawi 
Congress Party) was fired, allegedly because of ‘treading on sensitive ground’ (Khembo 2003:23). 
This particular case clearly points to diffusion rather than separation of the three branches of 
government in Malawi. 
Comparing the support to the committee system 
Without the necessary technical backing, funding and human resources parliament’s oversight 
function is diminished. The technical assistance provided to the Uganda committees has recently 
been improved as a parliamentary budget office was established in 2001 to provide assistance to the 
MPs in budget related work (came with the enactment of the Public Finance Act) and there is also a 
research department. Still there is a considerable backlog in the three committees dealing with the 
SAI reports. A member of the budget committee frankly states, 
 
“He [the auditor general] has put a lot of effort into having timely reports. The 
problem now is rather with us in parliament. The reports have not been considered 
by us. We have not found an effective way to deal with the report. The chair of the 
PAC tries hard but we have a problem here. It is a difficult area”.56  
 
The PAC at the moment examines the 2001/2002 report, the LAAC is still working on the report for 
2000/2001 but has not presented a report to parliament yet. One of the committee members explains 
that so far there has been no time to present it in the plenary.57 The committee on commissions, 
statutory authorities and state enterprises are currently looking at the SAI reports on the Uganda 
Revenue Authority from 1998/1999/2000. 58 Some of the ineffectiveness in the handling of reports is 
due to lack of research assistance and other necessary facilities such as office space.  
 In Tanzania the relevant committees like the PAC and the LAAC seem to do less well than 
the oversight committees in Uganda, particularly in terms of technical assistance. The Tanzanian 
committees also have inadequate human and financial resources to the extent that they are unable to 
                                                 
54 Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04. 
55 Interview donor representative, Tanzania 06/07/04. 
56 Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04.  
57 Interview MP, Uganda 26/07/04. 
58 Interview MP, Uganda 20/07/04. 
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carry out proper oversight (Rutashobya 2004:28). Few of the MPs serving on the committees have 
the professional backgrounds and skills required to scrutinize the auditor general’s reports and their 
expertise is further weakened by the arrangement whereby committee membership only lasts for 2 
1/2 years. The parliamentarians also suffer from a basic lack of researched information. The MPs do 
not have adequate working tools – they lack clerks, offices and access to computers. This clearly 
impedes the work of the PAC and the LAAC. The meetings of the committees are often held the 
week before a parliamentary session starts and they take place in Dar es Salaam (where all the 
ministries except one is situated), while the sessions are held at the Bunge building in Dodoma. The 
MPs are in other words spending much of their time commuting between Dar es Salaam, Dodoma 
and their constituencies. The time for committee meetings is also perceived as limited by the MPs 
although they are allotted more time than only a few years ago.  
 The Malawi PAC suffers from the same shortcomings as the oversight committees in 
Tanzania and Uganda, but is even more constrained by resource deficits. Government funding of 
parliament only covers plenary work resulting in a situation where the committee system is 
sustained by donor funding. Donor dependency has created a donor directed committee system 
where only the committees receiving funding meet (this amounts to 6-7 committees out of 17) 
(Patel and Tostensen 2004). The committees the donors consider most important keep up a certain 
level of activity while the others are more or less dormant. The speaker of parliament lamented that 
“Most parliamentary committees are failing to meet. Donors cherry pick which ones to fund, and 
they all pick the same ones”.59 The PAC and the budget and finance committee are the two most 
favoured. PAC reports to meet every month, the budget and finance committee about the same.60 
The tenure of MPs on committees does not necessarily last for the entire term of the legislature as 
political parties want to maintain tight control over their members and therefore is not willing to 
grant the parliamentarians this security and confidence. Despite a certain upgrading of  
parliamentary facilities and support functions since 1999 the 17 committees only have 2 researchers 
and 4 clerks to assist them and no computer and internet facilities. They also lack meeting room 
(Patel and Tostensen 2004)61. In practice this means that the research assistance available is 
provided by donors. Coupled with weak capacity of MPs to understand the SAI reports, the 
oversight function of the PAC is significantly hampered. While members of the PAC and the budget 
and finance committee emphasised that the 2003 public audit act had empowered them to bring 
government officials in for questioning, they complained that reports were often late. These delays 
were often caused by controlling officers failing to respond to the auditor’s queries. As a result, the 
committee is not able thoroughly examine the SAI report. This means that parliament lacks capacity 
to go deeper into issues and, members of the budget and finance committee expressed frustration for 
having to rely on civil society and the government for information as they do not have capacity to 
source their own information.62 
The effects of party discipline on the accountability function of parliament  
The mechanisms of sanction at the committees’ disposal are of prime importance for parliament’s 
ability to follow up on audit findings and monitor the implementation of committee 
recommendations. The “party” groups of the ruling “parties” in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi 
exercise considerable control over their respective parliamentarians. Uganda’s ‘no-party system’ of 
                                                 
59 Interview Speaker, Malawi 15/03/04 
60 Focus group interview with members of the public accounts and the budget and finance committees of the 
Malawi parliament 18/03/04.  
61 A decision by president Mutharika to move parliament out of State House has meant that since January 
2005 parliamentary committees have met in hotels and all documents and other resources are stored in 
warehouses severely hampering parliament’s ability to check on the executive.  
62 Focus group interview with members of the public accounts and budget and finance committees of the 
Malawi parliament 18/03/04.  
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politics means that there are no official party groups in parliament but there are a number of 
caucuses such as the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum, the Young Parliamentarians Association, and 
the Acholi, Teso and Lango parliamentary groups that have voiced criticism against the government 
(Moncrieffe 2004:22). Not least there is a very active Movement caucus which at times is hard to 
distinguish from a parliamentary party caucus (Piron and Norton 2004:26) as it is active and 
successful in disciplining and gathering support when important and prestigious legislation is about 
to be voted over in parliament.63 Irrespective of the coalition formation and lobbying going on in 
parliament, there is in general little suspense attached to the outcome of issues considered important 
to the executive. One of the members of the local authorites’ accounts committee asserts, “You are 
perhaps open minded in the caucus, but when an issue has been decided here you have to abide. 
There are so many groupings but the majority is of course set in advance since the Movementists 
largely outnumber the opposition”.64 An effective way of silencing critical MPs has been to co-opt 
them into the government (Piron and Norton 2004:26-27). The Movement is known to be selective 
in its sponsoring of candidates and expects loyalty in return for electoral support.65  
 In Tanzania  the CCM party group organization is considerably more institutionalised and 
advanced than that of the opposition. The whip system and the CCM party caucus have become 
forceful organs of making the CCM MPs toe the party line. A senior CCM MP puts it in this way: 
 
“Parliament is not fulfilling its oversight role to the extent I would like. The 
relationship between the legislature and the executive, in general, I would say that 
there is no level of independence on the part of parliament. Definitely not to the 
extent I would like. A lot is still to be desired”.66  
 
The president has on several occasions made it clear in meetings of the CCM party caucus that MPs 
opposing particular pieces of legislation in parliament will not be able to stand for re-election and 
according to Tanzanian electoral law you cannot cross the floor in Parliament (Wang 2005). This in 
turn provides the parties with an effective disciplinary mechanism. Expulsion from the party in 
practice means that you have to resign your parliamentary seat. Since there is a lot at stake for an 
MP in such a situation, the incentive for acting according to party discipline is strong. The MPs 
from the ruling party is not expected to query party policy, at least not when it has been introduced 
in the plenary. The speaker of parliament Pius Msekwa when discussing the party discipline in the 
Tanzanian parliament is crystal clear in his statements;  
 
“it is therefore absolutely naïve for anyone to expect that the majority ruling party 
members of parliament will do anything which might result in their government’s 
proposals being defeated. It is a moral obligation for them to support the 
government of their party on the floor of the House” (Msekwa 2000:76).  
 
One of the parliamentarians (CCM and former member of LAAC) stated that: 
 
“Toeing the party line is very important. You would not go against it because you 
are also serving the party. This is very detrimental to parliamentary oversight. You 
can see that this is wrong but what can you do? You have to serve your scheme!”67  
 
In contrast to Uganda and Tanzania there is shifting coalitions in Malawi and no dominant party. 
This has, however, proved to be a strong breeding ground for executive dominance as every vote 
                                                 
63 Interview MP, Uganda 13/07/04; Interview MP, Uganda 14/07/04; Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04. 
64 Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04.  
65 Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04.  
66 Interview MP, Tanzania 06/07/04.  
67 Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04. 
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counts for the government – in fact one vote could be decisive for its ability to rule. This has 
reinforced a system of patronage and a number of the MPs claim that they are unable to deliberate 
freely in the House and they perceive the party caucuses as a means for the parties to enforce their 
views on them (Patel and Tostensen 2004). This is confirmed by our interviews with Malawian MPs 
who felt precluded from articulating national interests due to party loyalty. The Public Affairs 
Committee, a Malawi NGO focused on civic affairs, in relation to this comments that:  
 
“the UDF68 and Aford69 continue to harass and intimidate MPs who are not in 
favour of third term Constitutional Amendment. … we are convinced that one 
major strategy the ruling party has embarked on is to perpetuate harassment and 
intimidation among those people who wisely reject the third term bid…. (PAC 
statement, October 22, 2002, Cited in Dulani and van Donge 2004:24). 
 
From this it is reasonable to believe that not abiding by the party line could have severe 
consequences. Malawian MPs for instance refer to extreme reactions such as party expulsion or 
demotion to insignificant positions (Patel and Tostensen 2004:16-17; Khembo 2003:35). The 
coalitions between the UDF and the opposition have also strengthened the hand of the executive. 
Interviews with MPs revealed that both for MPs from government party and the opposition there 
were repercussions for speaking up against government as they risked reductions in developing 
funds to constituencies with ‘critical MPs’.  
Follow up of audit findings 
The greatest problem is, however, the lack of follow up of audit findings. In Malawi controlling 
officers are reported to “rarely bother to provide replies to the findings of the auditor general’s 
office” and PAC recommendations (Khembo 2003:47) and overall the auditees’ effort to comply 
with recommendations and required action is at best unreliable. According to members of the PAC, 
the main weakness is that the system provides few openings for sanctioning controlling officers. So 
far instances of disciplinary measures taken on permanent secretaries (controlling officers) are non-
existent. Habitually, defaulting officers are moved to other ministries with no other legal actions. 
Since the committee does not itself effect sanctions, its recommendations can easily be ignored by 
those empowered to take such action. The MPs incentive to pressure and follow up on government 
action or inaction is also limited. Committee members interviewed complained that increased 
committee activity (resulting from donor finances) kept them away from their constituencies and 
that the oversight function of the office was in direct conflict with the direct (vertical) accountability 
function vis-à-vis the constituencies.70 Treasury memorandums are rarely received by the committee 
and even if these had been produced lack of capacity, time and incentives on the part of the MPs to 
examine them would most likely render them unimportant. At the moment what exists of follow up 
on enforcement of PAC advice takes place when a new audit report is scrutinised.  
 The story is by and large repeated in Tanzania. The PAC is hampered in its work by a lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms and disciplinary measures for non-compliance (Naschold and 
Fozzard 2002:46; Rutashobya 2004:30). The committees have the possibility to go deeper into 
issues in the audit reports by means of establishing select or probe committees to conduct inquiries. 
In July 2004 a sub-committee of the PAC was in fact in London to investigate into allegations of 
misuse of public funds which included government shares in the Mwadui Diamonds mine 
(IPPmedia 09/04/04).71 However, forming a select committee entails a rather elaborate procedure. A 
                                                 
68 United Democratic Front 
69 Alliance for Democracy 
70 Focus group interview with members of the public accounts committee and the budget and finance 
committee of the Malawi parliament 18/03/04. 
71 Interview MP,Tanzania, 09/07/04; Interview MP, Tanzania, 09/07/04. 
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private member motion has to be moved and the motions are frequently turned down. Part of the 
reason is lack of funding but the interests of the ruling party are also of relevance, “the party has to 
agree to the private member motion to establish such a committee. You must think about whether it 
will be detrimental to the government. The ruling party will often not accept... For the opposition 
there is no point in introducing private member motions – it will not go through anyway”.72 As in 
Malawi there are few incentives on the executive to act in accordance with PAC recommendations. 
The committee meetings take place ‘in camera’ which is in contravention of internationally 
acceptable standards since it diminishes transparency and possibly also the effect of audit findings.  
 The available disciplinary measures are also inadequate. Already in 2002 it was pointed out 
that the permanent secretary of finance lacks authority (see, Naschold and Fozzard 2002:37). He is 
at the same level as other Ministries’ chief accounting officers, and has not been adequately 
empowered to ensure that they implement the changes recommended by the PAC and the LAAC 
(Wilcox and Gerden 2004). It should be noted, however, that public officials who are found guilty 
of financial mismanagement are normally punished, mostly involving forced retirement in the 
public interest (see, Rutashobya 2004:28). The executive’s reporting back to parliament in the form 
of a treasury memoranda is also a weak area (Rutashobya 2004). Only two of the Tanzanian MPs 
interviewed mentioned the existence of this procedure indicating that this is not an effective 
mechanism of follow up of corrective measures taken.73 Most of the MPs referred to the scrutiny of 
the SAI report as practically the only way to check on the implementation of committee 
recommendations.  
 The Ugandan oversight committees face many of the same problems identified in Malawi 
and Tanzania but possibly to a lesser extent. Particularly the Ugandan PAC has been able to better 
exploit the opportunities the committee has to hold the executive accountable. An explanation of 
this is that there is considerable openness of committee proceedings as opposed to in Tanzania. 
PAC sessions are open to the press and officials from the SAI, the accountant generals office, and 
the criminal investigation department. The latter is invited because, in the words of the committee 
chair “we would like to include prima facie cases in the event of embezzlement of funds to ensure 
prosecution”.74 This has ensured a quick response and that action is taken in cases of outright fraud. 
While the PAC has been reasonably effective in this regard the local authorities’ accounts 
committee has a less impressive track record. The committee has held some hearings and chief 
administrative officers have been taken to court as a result, but the committee has so far not 
presented a single report in the plenary, and the committee members seem rather puzzled by this. 
What is certain is that the report is not an issue of priority since the Speaker has not been able to 
find the time to discuss the report. One of the committee members explains “This is a weakness and 
I am not entirely sure what the reason is. Sometimes I think it depends on the chair’s ability to push 
the speaker. Now it is an issue between the chair and the speaker when the report shall be presented 
in parliament”.75  
 In conformity with the committees in Tanzania and Malawi there is also a substantial 
problem on the follow up side in Uganda. Once again lack of sufficient enforcement mechanisms is 
a problem. The treasury memorandums are not on time and as a rule they are not made use of by 
any of the committees. The LAAC has not yet received a treasury memorandum, the committee on 
state enterprises does not pay much attention to them (if it receives them at all) – as the deputy chair 
of the committee reveals “I do not think we receive the treasury memorandums. To me I do not see 
the way we follow up. This one is missing”.76 The PAC at least receives the treasury memorandums 
but do not have the time to examine them as is evident by this statement made by one of the 
committee members: 
                                                 
72 Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04. 
73 Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04; Interview MP, Tanzania 09/07/04.  
74 Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04. 
75 Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04. 
76 Interview MP, Uganda, 20/07/ 04. 
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“Some ministries are actually getting a clean bill and the size of the treasury 
memorandum gets less and less so we are improving. But there is no time to 
analyze the treasury memorandum. We do not have enough time and resources to 
find out the effect of our recommendations and how much of the money lost or 
unaccounted for was recovered”.77  
 
Although non-compliance may be included in the coming SAI report waiting a whole year 
contributes to considerable delays and less effective follow up. The outcome is that enforcement 
ultimately depends on the will of the executive to take action which is hardly a recipe for success.  
 The Tanzanian executive is commonly held to experience little pressure from parliament (see, 
Frantz 2004:14, Wang 2005). A former PAC member simply states “In Tanzania you have 
separation of powers when it seems to serve the government’s powers and only then”.78 The party 
discipline is so strong that it negatively affects parliament’s ability to hold the executive to account 
(Wang 2005). Although the Uganda legislature commonly is held to be rather potent the Movement 
caucus is very active when important bills are to be passed (Moncrieffe 2004:21; Piron and Norton 
2004:27). MPs reputed for being critical have experienced opposition by the Movement and/or lack 
of support when standing for re-election. In the words of a member of the budget committee in 
Uganda,  
 
“The Movement political system has a lot of problems […] When you get into 
parliament you are independent and the system worked like this maybe for one-two 
years. After this the Movement people started to favour certain people over others 
and the system of individual merit vanished. Those favoured have tended to behave 
in a manner where they support the policies of the government almost without 
question.”79  
 
Similarly, the Malawi national assembly has been seen as a rubber stamp of the executive’s 
decisions and there is little distinction between the government and the incumbent party UDF (Patel 
and Tostensen 2004; Rakner et al. 2004). Weak party identities and lack of ideological differences 
between parties have increased executive dominance (Rakner et al. 2004b).  
 In sum we have found that particularly the Uganda PAC but also to some extent the Tanzania 
PAC have gained a modicum of strength in acting upon the SAI reports. The Malawi PAC is less 
active than its Tanzania and Uganda counterparts. The committee performance is in part explained 
by the support to the committee system. The Malawi committees’ are more constrained by resource 
deficits than the committees in the other two countries. The relevant Ugandan committees seem to 
do the best in terms of technical assistance and funding while the Tanzanian committees take a 
middle position. Despite their different systems of governance a common denominator is that 
executive dominance, party discipline and weak opposition parties constrain the accountability 
function of parliament in all three countries. Overall the relative strength or weakness of the 
committees is reflected in the follow up of audit findings in the respective countries.  
 
                                                 
77 Interview MP,Uganda 19/07/04.  
78 Interview MP, Tanzania 08/07/04. 
79 Interview MP, Uganda 16/07/04.  
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Table 6 Summary of findings parliament 
Supreme audit institution Aspects of 
SAI power Tanzania Uganda Malawi  
Parliament PAC and LAAC gained 
strength in overseeing 
governmental processes. 
Suffer from inadequate 
resources, skills and 
leverage. Committee 
meetings not open to the 
public. Strong party 
discipline of the ruling 
party. Few enforcement 
mechanisms and penalties 
for non-compliance. Probe 
committees used with 
some success. Treasury 
memo often late and often 
not used for follow up.  
PAC assertive, summons 
officials and locks accounting 
officers up in parliament cell. 
Technical assistance 
provided MPs better than in 
Tanzania and Malawi. 
Committee meetings open. 
Parliament caucus (NRM) 
forceful, inducing discipline 
constraining work of 
committees. PAC better able 
to exploit opportunities to 
hold executive to account 
than Malawi and Tanzania 
counterparts. Backlog of 
accounts in LAAC and the 
committee on public 
enterprises. Treasury memo 
rarely looked at by 
committee. Limited 
enforcement mech.  
PAC calls officers to stand 
before it but not as high 
profile as Uganda and 
Tanzania PACs. 
Constrained by lack of 
funding and resources. 
Meets irregularly and 
dependent on donor 
funding. Lacks research and 
technical assistance and 
skills of MPs low. Shifting 
coalitions serve as breeding 
ground for executive 
dominance. Committees can 
only recommend and not 
affect sanctions. No cases of 
disciplinary measures taken 
on controlling officers, who 
rarely reply to the AG and 
PAC.  
Implications Parliamentary stage of audit cycle hampered by lack of resources and leverage. Particularly 
Uganda PAC, but also to lesser extent PAC in Tanzania, have gained a modicum of 
strength in acting upon the auditor general’s reports. Malawi PAC less active, in part 
explained by support given to committee system. Malawi PAC more constrained by 
resource deficits than Uganda and Tanzania counterparts. Ugandan committees do best in 
terms of technical assistance and funding. Party (Movement) discipline and executive 
dominance serve as constraint on operations of committees in all three countries. Problems 
on follow up– committees unable to check and ensure that recommendations are taken into 
account and acted upon. Outcome: follow up takes place when scrutinizing next year’s 
audit report. Despite grave weaknesses Uganda the best performer with respect to follow 
up, Malawi struggles the most.  
4.2 The media and civil society 
Overall, media coverage of audit findings is poor in all three countries studied– none of the offices 
have an explicit media strategy. Coverage mostly takes place when the PACs or similar committees 
debate the annual SAI reports. Then findings sometimes hit the newspaper headlines, but they are 
hardly ever used as a basis for further research. Part of the problem is a weak press. Even in Uganda 
which in the sub-Saharan context is renowned for its independent and vital press exposure of audit 
findings is low. One of the leading journalists in Uganda readily admits that “I would say that there 
is no relationship between the media the office of the auditor general” and goes on to add “As you 
know the media is event oriented so the coverage is not really thorough. The media is financially 
restrained which also means that we cannot investigate properly because we must be productive”.80 
The minimal media coverage suggests that the SAI is not well known by the wider public (Bategeka 
2004:17).  
 To the SAIs the lack of interaction with the media represents a lost opportunity to promote 
themselves and their work. The media could for instance aid in building audit literacy and 
suggesting sites for audit (Krafchik 2003). In Malawi press reports about corruption has functioned 
as important sources of information about corruption for the auditor general. The reports are 
                                                 
80 Interview media representative, Uganda 26/07/04. 
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considered fairly reliable (Khembo 2003: 41). Audit literacy could be reached by approaching the 
media more actively and even establish some form of outreach program within the SAI. 
Cooperation with civil society organisations (CSOs) could also provide the SAI with an opportunity 
to expose itself. The Uganda Debt Network which is a coalition of civil society organisations has on 
occasions alerted the Uganda SAI of problems and perceived injustices. It has also helped to track 
expenditures and correct leakages in the transfer of funds. In Malawi and Uganda civil society 
groups (e.g. the Uganda Debt Network and the Malawi Economic Justice Network) has measured 
the performance of programs that are part of the poverty reduction strategy process. This can 
become a constructive contribution to the SAIs in their effort to conduct performance audits at the 
local level (UDN 2003; Krafchik 2003). But unless government is willing to enter into dialogue 
with civil society, it may be difficult for civil society to perform a role in relation to the SAI. A civil 
society representative holds that: “The problem is that civil society is viewed as an opponent of 
government, like the opposition. As a result, government will not accept our word, they will not 
listen. Our only hope is the donors, but they are not particularly helpful either”.81 In part, the 
relationship between civil society and government in Malawi is explained by a culture that does not 
readily accept opposing views and positions. A senior civil servant argues that if you question 
people in government, you are considered an enemy.82 Tanzania is seemingly lagging behind in 
CSO monitoring of public expenditure although civic organizations like the Tanzania Gender 
Networking Programme (particular focus on budgetary processes to address gender equality), the 
Hakikazi Catalyst (poverty reduction strategy monitoring, review and budget tracking) and Action 
Aid (poverty reduction strategy paper budget monitoring through institutional development of local 
organizations) gradually are getting more involved in budget analysis and monitoring (ARD Inc. 
2003).83 
 
Table 7 Summary of findings civil society and media 
Supreme audit institution Aspects of SAI power 
Tanzania Uganda Malawi  
Media and civil 
society 
SAI no official media 
strategy. CSOs not 
active in monitoring of 
public expenditure 
Media exposure of SAI 
findings low, but has 
come further than in 
Tanzania and Malawi. 
Uganda Debt Network 
has alerted the SAI of 
problems and 
measures performance 
of programs.  
 
Media coverage of SAI 
findings scant, but press 
reports have functioned as 
sources of info about 
corruption for SAI. CSOs 
relations with SAI emerging.  
Implications The SAIs lack of cooperation with the media and the civil society represent a 
missed opportunity to promote and improve its work. The institutions are ‘on 
their own’ in all three countries – possibly more so in Tanzania than in Malawi 
and Uganda. The interactions between SAIs and CSOs seem best developed in 
Uganda.  
4.3 The relationship between supreme audit institutions and the 
donors  
There is currently an ongoing international trend towards a shift in aid modalities from project aid 
to various forms of programme aid (sector wide approaches) and recently also general budget 
support. The latter signifies a reduction in tied aid and increased co-ordination of donor assistance. 
                                                 
81 Interview civil society representative, Malawi 23/03/04. 
82 Interview senior civil servant, Malawi 18/03/04. 
83 See also www.internationalbudget.org. 
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This entails that a greater amount of aid being ‘on budget’ and thus allocated in the budget process 
and audited by the SAI. General budget support also enhances predictability since project support to 
a larger extent is subject to delays and uncertainty (due to a need for physical implementation of 
investments) (Odén and Tinnes 2003:31). In general terms general budget support is expected to 
enhance local ownership by strengthening accountability relationships within the government and 
eventually lead to improved service delivery and poverty reduction (Frantz 2004). A precondition 
for these aid modalities is that the recipient government and donors agree on the main framework 
and policies for allocating resources and that the government has sufficient capacity to implement 
and account for them.  
 An important element of the Malawi PRSP is the promise of a new and more streamlined 
relationship between donors, the government and civil society based on the principle of partnership 
rather than conditionality. A number of government officials and other observers of Malawi politics 
refer to a “command-and-control mindset” of international financial institutions (Jenkins and Tsoka 
2003:142) and a relationship of distrust has built up between donors and the government. Quotes 
from public sector respondents and donors are telling. A cabinet minister refers to donor 
conditionalities in the following way “It is insulting; we should do it on our own,” 84 while a 
ministry of finance official stresses that “donors come here and create new structures and 
institutions that are costly. Then they leave and government finds it difficult to support and maintain 
the institutional structures.”85 As opposed to this a representative from the donor community states 
that, “I do not agree that there is a lack of political will in Malawi, there is strong political will - to 
avoid change at any cost.”86 
 It has been suggested that donor agencies exacerbate and contribute to the weak financial 
management and accountability. Donor coordination has not yet become highly advanced in 
Malawi. This may in part be explained by the donor modalities implemented. General budget 
support and sector wide approaches automatically raise the demands on donor harmonisation. The 
general budget support process has for instance been at the core of improved harmonisation in 
Tanzania (Odén and Tinnes 2003:18). In Malawi the experience with general budget support has 
been erratic and has curbed harmonisation. 87 General budget support was suspended in 2001 when 
the government had failed to demonstrate ability to implement pro-poor policies and to raise, 
allocate and account for public resources. This aggravated the problems caused by the high level of 
fiscal deficit and the government of Malawi in response increased domestic borrowing to bridge the 
gap. Donors have been hesitant to resume aid as fiscal discipline has been consistently poor but 
when the International Monetary Fund approved Malawi’s poverty reduction growth facility, 
general budget support was recommenced. 
 In contrast to the Malawi case, a growing amount of donor funds are channelled through the 
national budget in Uganda and Tanzania. Uganda was the first country to receive general budget 
support from the World Bank in the form of a poverty reduction support credit (PRSC) and in 
September 2002 it was granted a three year International Monetary Fund poverty reduction and 
growth facility (Piron and Norton 2004:22). Donors now provide over 52% of budget funding and 
all of this is targeted at Poverty Eradication Action Plan priorities88. Donor aid has been well 
coordinated in order to meet PEAP targets and priorities and a PRSC matrix serves as a mechanism 
                                                 
84 Interview government representative, Malawi 16/03/04. 
85 Interview ministry of finance official, Malawi 16/03/04.  
86 Interview donor representative, Malawi 13/03/04.  
87 At the moment Malawi receives general budget support from the International Monetary Fund and the 
Common Approach to Budget Support group which is a composition of European donor countries including 
the European Union, Denmark, Sweden, the UK and Norway. The group conducts regular reviews and has 
agreed on their own matrix of measures. It attempts to link disbursements closely to progress in the 
implementation of the Malawi PRSP.  
88 The UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the EU provide general budget support and 
performance assessment framework programme support. In addition some donors provide sector support 
(Moncrieffe 2004:37). 
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for creating dialogue between donors and the government on the implementation of the PEAP 
(Piron and Evans 2004). The ministry of finance is perceived to be highly independent as well as 
pragmatic in its relationship to donors. General budget support is stressed as the preferred aid 
modality and sector working groups are open to donor staff so that the ministry of finance can draw 
on their technical skills earlier in the process of developing standards and policies (Piron and 
Norton 2004:18-19). Recognizing that there will always be donors unable to provide general budget 
support or earmarked general budget support, the government of Uganda demands that all support, 
also project support, should be consistent with each sector programme’s priorities and makes clear 
that any offers of stand alone donor projects will be declined. All expenditure within the medium 
term expenditure framework should be registered in due time with the ministry of finance (Piron 
and Norton 2004:21). Donors have been willing to meet some of the demands and practices have 
been changed in order to cooperate - even USAID relates its programs to the PEAP. Despite being 
in sympathy with the government’s intentions some donors have lately perceived the government as 
being too rigorous in the implementation of the above rules.89 Donors also speculate that the 
government attempts to undermine their political influence, particularly over defence, by taking an 
excessively strong line on budget deficit (Piron and Norton 2004:39). A governance matrix has been 
established by a number of bilateral donors to allow the discussion of governance issues that are felt 
inappropriate to bring up in relation to the PRSC Matrix such as defence (Piron and Evans 
2004:33).90  
 A poverty reduction budget support facility (PRBS) was started in Tanzania in 2000/01 
(Frantz 2004:3). This facility existed prior to the World Bank PRSC. The PRBS is a budget support 
scheme with a single account into which eleven aid agencies at the moment channel their general 
budget support (Frantz 2004) 91. The first PRSC was prepared for fiscal year 2003/04 and the 
government of Tanzania in 2001 strongly encouraged a merging of the PRBS and the PRSC to 
reduce its own transaction costs. The outcome was a partnership framework memorandum and a 
joint performance assessment framework. The final performance assessment framework discussions 
took place in March 2003 (Odén and Tinnes 2003). The partnership framework memorandum 
outlines the provisions of general budget support while the performance assessment framework is 
the chief basis for policy dialogue and it is the overall implementation of this framework that 
triggers disbursements92. The PRBS/PRSC has been characterised a well-functioning and a model 
arrangement of donor-government “partnership” that could be copied in other countries where aid 
volumes are significant in relation to overall public expenditure (Aarnes 2004; Frantz 2004). This 
was also stressed by representatives from the donor community. One for instance stated that 
“Tanzania has come the furthest in integrating the donor community into the budgetary process 
through the [PRBS] group”.93  
 In parallel to Uganda and Malawi, the Tanzania ministry of finance strongly encourages 
donors to channel project funds through the Exchequer System and improve reporting so that 
project accounts can be accounted for. The preferred relationship to development partners are laid 
                                                 
89 Interview donor representative, Uganda 15/07/04. 
90 The public sector reform issues included ranges from the debate around a third term in office for president 
Museveni, defence expenditure, corruption, monitoring excessive use of force, unconstitutional trials by the 
justice sector to opening up the system for multipartyism. It is noteworthy that the conflict in the North is 
perceived to be so touchy that it cannot even be discussed in this forum (Piron and Evans 2004:33).  
91 The countries are Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK. As in Uganda it is only DFID, among the bilateral donors, that attempts to move 
most of its aid into the PRBS. 
92 Donors have expressed interest in gradually phasing out this facility and rely entirely on the poverty 
reduction strategy planning and progress reports prepared by the Government. At the time being donors do 
not consider the quality of the progress reports as up to standard (Simpson 2004:53). 
93 Interview donor representative, Tanzania 01/07/04.  
CMI REPORT THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS IN MALAWI … R 2005: 4  
 33 
out in the 2002 Tanzania assistance strategy.94 In the 2002/03 budget there was an increase in the 
coverage of project aid inflows but weaknesses in this area remain. In spite of this, the shift towards 
new aid modalities has generated deeper ownership in programme implementation by government 
agencies. Although improvements in reporting are slow (Evans and Ngalewa 2003: 264) projected 
donor disbursements have generally been on time and a large part of the PRBS funds are disbursed 
early in the fiscal year on the request of the ministry of finance (Odén and Tinnes 2003:14, 30-31).95 
The rapid increase of programme aid modalities has, however, multiplied the number of new 
processes linked to the monitoring of the programmes, and this has created coordination and 
transaction cost problems. This has also affected the SAI. As argued by the Tanzania auditor 
general: 
 
 “Most of the donors consult us when they want to do their own auditing and we 
agree. Sometimes it is convenient for us to agree to the selection of a private audit 
firm but again you have particular areas where there is basket funding – it is not just 
one donor. There are various donors. Now, over there you really have a serious 
problem because each donor wants their own man.”96  
‘Off- budget’ donor funds 
Even with the implementation of new aid modalities there is in all three countries a problem with 
off-budget donor funds to line ministries or other spending agencies, thus making it hard for the SAI 
to keep track of and audit these expenditures97 (Tanzania MOF 2004:4; Foster et al. 2002; UNAO 
2003). In 2002 it was noted that Tanzania’s ability to impose hard budget constraints was limited by 
around half of all donor funds being off budget. In addition personal emoluments were negotiated 
separately (Foster et al. 2002:45). As pointed out by the Tanzania ministry of finance “project 
funding remains to be a major modality of external financing over the period of the medium term 
expenditure framework in most sectors” (Tanzania MOF 2004:5). In 2001/02 programme aid 
accounted for not more than half of total grant assistance (Evans and Ngalewa 2003:264). Today an 
increased share of aid is recorded in the budget, related to the creation of an aid flows database 
within the ministry of finance in 2001 and the move from project aid to budget and sector 
programme support. Nearly all aid to central government is on budget, while all the support going 
directly to the districts is still not included (Odén and Tinnes 2003:14-15). More specifically this 
means that although 30-40 percent of public sector activities are funded by means of donor money 
only a small amount is on budget (Aarnes 2004:8). The report of the Uganda auditor general for the 
financial year ended in June 2003 observes that “a substantial number of donor funded projects still 
receive part of their funding directly from the donors without going through the government 
consolidated fund” (UNAO 2003:3). In 2002 40% of aid was off-budget in Malawi (Foster et al. 
2002: 47) and the situation has not improved significantly. Formally all donor aid should be 
registered with the debt and aid section of the ministry of finance but donor projects are commonly 
                                                 
94 Both parties’ adherence to their respective commit ments in the Tanzania assistance strategy is evaluated in 
advance of consultative group meetings by an independent monitoring group (originated on the basis of the 
1995 Helleiner Report which examined the relationship between donors and the Government and 
recommended ways in which the relationship might be improved). This type of institutionalised mutual 
review process, conducted by an independent body, is unique to Tanzania (Frantz 2004).  
95 Exceptions exist. DFID on one occasion froze aid for some months in 2002 over a disagreement on GoT 
procurement of radar equipment. At the same time several bilateral donors postponed PRBS contributions and 
disbursement from other multilateral agencies were delayed. The outcome was low budget liquidity (Odén 
and Tinnes 2003:31-32).  
96 Interview Auditor General, Tanzania  06/07/04.  
97 In Tanzania ministries, departments and agencies have been instructed to report quarterly on expenditures 
from foreign projects, and the Ministry of Finance is to audit these reports so that capturing of the expenditure 
and accountability can be improved (Tanzania MoF 2004:4).  
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off-budget. An explanation is that there are strong incentives for line ministries to encourage project 
support as this provides funds for staff allowances, vehicles etc. Project implementation is patchy as 
failures to live up to conditionalities are common with a turn off in donor funds as a result (Rakner 
et al. 2004:12).  
 
Table 8 Summary of findings donors  
Supreme audit institution Aspects of SAI power 
Tanzania Uganda Malawi 
Donors Donor coordination 
well developed and 
PRBS/PRSC facility 
seen as model 
arrangement. Rapid 
increase in forms of 
programme aid has led 
to transaction cost 
problems. Most central 
government aid on 
budget. In part support 
going directly to 
districts still not 
included.  
Donor aid well 
coordinated in order to 
meet PEAP targets and 
priorities. Donors 
willing to meet several 
of the demands of min 
of fin. Some 
governance issues are 
perceived as hard to 
bring to government. 
Several donor funded 
projects still off-
budget.  
High degree of distrust 
between government and 
donors due to erratic 
general budget support, 
hampering harmonization. 
Shift in aid modalities, but 
problem with off-budget 
donor funds greater than in 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
Implications Lack of donor coordination adds to the workload of SAI and places excessive 
demands on weak institutional capacity. The interaction between the Malawi 
Government and donors has been problematic while donor harmonization is 
more developed in Uganda and Tanzania.  The PRBS/PRSC facility in Tanzania 
is considered as particularly well-functioning, but the increase in programme 
aid modalities has led to transaction cost problems. An increasing amount of 
donor funds are channelled through the budgetary process - especially in 
Tanzania and Uganda – but donor funding going straight into off-budget funds 
or straight to ministries remain. As a result, SAI cannot track or audit these 
expenditures, undermining its authority.  
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5. Economic accountability and the performance of 
SAIs  
A key element of economic accountability is to ensure that public resources are spent according to 
the electoral and administrative mandate; that funds are distributed in consistence with stated 
objectives, and that corruption is avoided. Weaknesses in the audit cycle may have serious 
implications for poverty reduction targets spelt out in a country’s poverty reduction strategy. The 
starting point of our investigation has been that supreme audit institutions play a key role in terms of 
checking governmental accountability over public funds.  
 Our analysis has pointed to several deficiencies in the mandate, capacity, autonomy, as well 
as the supportive environment of the SAIs in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi. These weaknesses 
present stakeholders within government, parliament, opposition parties, civil society, and the donor 
community with several challenging tasks. Despite the ongoing public financial management 
reforms implemented in the wake of PRSP, we find that the significant role and function of the 
SAIs within these processes in Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania have not been taken sufficiently into 
account. Overall, donor initiatives focused on the audit institutions have largely been short-term and 
un-coordinated commitments provided by a number of donors. Most assistance has centred on 
technical assistance and some have not been particularly well adjusted to the needs of the recipient. 
The Malawi auditor general expressed his frustration by the situation: “Donors bring in a structure, 
then they disappear, you are left with the costs of maintaining buildings, employees, in reality these 
gifts are adding to the problem”.98  
 Our findings indicate that the SAI reports can be relied on to identify instances of financial 
mismanagement, but within limits. The quality of the annual audit reports is unsatisfactory. Two 
years ago Cowater International (2002: 57) noted that the annual Malawi SAI report included 
“extensive amounts of listings of individual transactions which might be distracting from the main 
messages of the report”. There is little reason to believe that the SAI has considerably improved its 
ability to get the message across. The Swedish director of the institutional support program to the 
Malawi SAI refers to the Malawi SAI report as substandard according to the auditing standards 
prescribed by the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) (Seminar 
Tanzania 05/07/04). The Tanzania and Uganda reports must be labelled the same. The INTOSAI 
standards set down that when a qualified (negative) certificate/opinion is given it must include a 
clear statement of the matter(s) giving raise to the qualification and if possible, financial 
qualification of the problem (SNAO 2003:11). A study of the national audit reports submitted to 
parliament in Tanzania showed that nearly 90% of the audit opinions reviewed had been qualified 
but lacked a proper explanation of which audit observations had led to the qualified 
certificate/opinion (SNAO 2003:11). Both the Uganda and Tanzania SAI reports contain few 
analyses of failures and recommendations for further action, little management information, and 
opinion are usually short rendering the reports of little use as tools to improve public financial 
accountability.  
 Despite improvements, supreme audit reports are habitually delayed in Tanzania, Uganda and 
Malawi. This failure to report to statutory deadlines diminishes the practical relevance of the audit 
report in the budget and financial management process. The Tanzania SAIs’ reports are delayed to 
the extent that they are irrelevant in the budget preparation (Wilcox and Gerden 2004). Presently the 
SAI report is finalised about 18 months after the end of the fiscal year while a proposed target is to 
produce the report within 12 months (PRBS/PRSC Review 2004:52). The Malawi SAI is a year 
behind in reporting to parliament (SNAO and MNAO 2003: 7; Rakner et al. 2004:18; Khembo 
                                                 
98 Interview Auditor General, Malawi 16/03/04. 
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2003:41-42). In Uganda the reports are now nearly up to date. The Uganda SAI is on time with its 
report on the central government accounts. The process of finishing the local government accounts 
and statutory corporations’ reports are more protracted but nearly on time (UNAO report 2004)99.  
 
Box 2: The pervasiveness of disclaimers in the Uganda SAI report 
 
The Uganda SAI report for fiscal year 2002/03 was by the donor community seen as particularly 
problematic. It gave a disclaimer* to over 82% of the total expenditures for the year 2002/03. A 
disclaimer means that the problems with the accounts were so sever that the auditor general could 
not make the necessary assessment of them. According to international standards the amount of 
errors should not exceed 2%. Allegedly part of the explanation of these potential misstatements 
was problems related to the shift from accounting on cash basis to accrual basis. Nonetheless the 
problem remains that there is substantial uncertainty in relation to the state of the public accounts 
of the Government of Uganda. The Uganda SAI report serves as conditionality for general budget 
support and other donor programs and its general value is clearly weakened by an excessive 
amount of potential misstatements.  
* There are generally four different audit opinions that may be given. 1) Unqualified (accounts 
accepted), 2) Qualified (one or more items make the statements inaccurate but not necessary to 
render the total financial statements misleading), 3) Disclaimer, 4) Adverse (the auditor general 
declares the accounts wrong).  
 
The real weakness in SAI performance is however to be found in the area of follow up. There are 
numerous instances of audit findings that never have been acted upon in the three countries. The 
same problems are repeated in the reports year after year underscoring a lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and incentives to impose sanctions, partly rendering the auditing a cosmetic exercise. 
In Malawi a number of auditees ignore audit findings and the follow up by the authorities is 
irregular (SNAO and MNAO 2003). There is, for instance, no evidence of disciplinary actions taken 
on permanent secretaries following SAI reports (Rakner et al. 2004:16). Authors continue observing 
that the serious deficiencies in implementation of follow up and enforcement of audit findings in 
Tanzania remain (Simpson 2004:38; Rutashobya 2004:26). Government agencies, local 
governments and parastatals are rarely held accountable for mismanagement (Rutashobya 2004). 
Similarly, Foster and Mijumbi (2002) stress that the executive’s response to audit queries and 
observations by the Uganda SAI is often poor and therefore an issue of continuing concern. 
Although the executive frequently act in response to the SAI report, “the general view is that such 
action is selective, only targeting those who have no patrons up in the hierarchy” (UDN 2004:10). 
The central government on its part is concerned about district and local level corruption (Moncrieffe 
2004:41-42). More specifically, it is alleged that the heads of the district administration, the chief 
administrative officers, collude in corruption with politicians at the local level (Liebowitz and 
Kwagala 2004:27). As one of the directors of audit in Uganda readily admitted “I would say that 
about 30-40% of the process is cosmetic. The net cannot catch the big fish because of the positions 
they are in”.100  
                                                 
99 Interview MP, Uganda 19/07/04; Interview Auditor General, Uganda 14/07/04; Interview SAI official, 
Uganda 14/07/04. 
100 Interview SAI official, Uganda 14/07/04. 
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Box 3: The Tanzania Paymaster General unable to take disciplinary action 
 
Already in 2002 Naschold and Fozzard (2002:37, 46) noted that PAC and LAAC recommendations 
in Tanzania were frequently ignored and that there was a general lack of effective mechanisms of 
sanction. One reason was that the permanent secretary of finance (in his statutory role the 
paymaster general) lacks authority since he is at the same level as the chief accounting officers in 
other ministries. This has thus for a long time been a well known problem and there is currently an 
ongoing process to increase the powers of the Tanzanian paymaster general. The aim is to 
empower him to take corrective action with respect to accounting officers who flout regulations 
and do not implement changes recommended by the PAC and the LAAC 
 
 
In terms of both institutional capabilities and relational resources arguably, the SAIs in Uganda 
performs slightly better than its Tanzanian counterpart, with the Malawian auditor general lagging 
behind. Few will be surprised by this conclusion as Uganda during the National Resistance 
Movement regime has placed great emphasis on poverty reduction, the fight against corruption and 
herein, oversight institutions. However, it has lately been suggested that the ownership of the 
poverty reduction agenda is challenged by growing politics of patronage (Hickey 2003:10). Piron 
and Evans (2004:25) point to tackling corruption in the public sector as a serious challenge and 
questions government commitment. Several other observers of Ugandan politics link the lack of 
progress in the fight against corruption to the upcoming 2006 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. A representative from the donor community calls attention to the problem when he states 
that,  
 
“The last three years there have been a decline in available resources to all sectors 
and a change in the atmosphere around corruption, now everything is about the 
elections, it is only these that are important. There is now a less than proper 
approach to corruption and this makes it difficult for us and the IGG [the Inspector 
General of Government] to deliver. This is an issue of political will and we just do 
not have control over it. At the moment there is no political will to fight 
corruption”.101  
 
                                                 
101 Interview donor representative 20/07/04.  
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TANZANIA 
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   General  
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Kjetil Lund, analysis division (Norw  
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E.K. Shuli, Assistant Auditor General 
Office of the President Mr. Msongole, Planning Commission 
Parliament (Fin and Ec Affairs) Hon. Njelu Kasaka (CCM), chair 
Hon. Hassy Kitine (CCM) 
Hon. Masungo (CCM) 
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Parliament (PAC) Hon. Dr. Amani W. A. Kabourou  
   (Chadema), former Chair of PAC and 
   leader of opposition 
Parliament (LAAC) Hon. Magapini, Deputy Chair 
Parliament (Comm on Environment) Hon. Anne Semamba Makinda (CCM), 
   Chair, former member of PAC,  
   member of Steering Comm 
Parliament (Social Service Comm) Hon. Sophia M. Simba (CCM), Chair,  
   former member of LAAC 
Parliament (Comm on Foreign, Defense and 
Security) 
Hon. Thomas S. Nyimbo (CCM) 
Parliament (APNAC) Hon. Dr. Zainab Amir Gama (CCM),  
   chair 
Hon. Ireneus Nduguru Ngwatura  
   (CCM), Deputy Chair 
Donors/NGOs/Academics  
SUNY Donna Bugby, Country Director SUNY 
   Program Tanzania  
Sida Erik Jonsson, Counselor/Economist 
Eliah Mwakagali, Program Officer,  
   public sector reforms 
Swedish National Audit Office102 Martin Wilcox, International Division 
Carl Åke Gerdén, Audit Director 
Consultant Geir Sundet 
TADREG Dr. Brian Cooksey, Director 
Repoa Erasto Ngalewa, Project Administrator  
                                                 
102 Seminar at the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam, 05/07/04. 
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ESRF Samuel Wangwe, Principal Research  
   Associate, Director Daima Associates 
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   Mgt. Services 
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MALAWI 
Organisation/Institution Names of Individuals and Positions Held 
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Hendrix Mazangera 
Collins Magalasi, National Coordinator                                 
Paul Msomali 
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PAC   Robert Phiri 
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Ministry of Finance Hon. Friday Jumbe, Minister 
Professor Matthews Chikaonda, former  
   Minister                                        Hon. Phillip 
Bwanali, former Deputy 
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Mrs. M Banda, Budget Director                                 
Auditor General  Mr. Kalangonda 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Dev Hon. Khwauli Msiska, Deputy Minister                                       
Mr. Kutangule, Principal Secretary 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry Hon. Sam Mpasu 
Office of President and Cabinet (OPC) Mr. Dzanjalimodzi, former Director of 
   Procurement 
Mr. Y Hassan, Director of Internal  
   Audits 
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Parliament   Hon. Davies Katsonga, Speaker 
Parliament (B and F)                       Hon. Chimango, Chair                                                                             
Hon. Chome (UDF)                                        
Hon. Mnesa (UDF)                                        
Hon. Chuthi (MCP) 
Parliament (PAC) Hon. Chiona, Chair   
Parliament (Public Appts Comm) Hon. Henry Mussa, former chair 
MRA Mr. Mtingwe 
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Mr. Banda, Assistant Director 
Ilovo Sugar Corporation   Brett Stewartson, Managing Director 
NICO Felix Mulusu, Managing Director 
Press Corporation   Dixie Kambauwa, Group Executive  
   Director 
Garment and Textiles Association  K K Desai 
Stanbic Bank       Victor Mbewe, Managing Director 
Limbe Leaf Charlie Graham 
Continental Discount House   Mr. Mwanamveka 
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Imani Development Group  John McGraff 
National Bank        George Partridge 
 
UGANDA 
Organisation/Institution Names of Individuals and Positions Held 
Public Sector  
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development 
Lawrence Semakula,  
   Commissioner/Treasury Officer of  
   Accounts 
Magona Mweru Ishmael, Commissioner 
   Budget, Policy and Evaluation Dep. 
Mr. Kissembo, Commissioner Internal  
   Audit 
Damoni Kitabire, Macroeconomic  
   Advisor, Planning and Development 
National Audit Office John F. S. Muwanga, Auditor General 
E. Obwona, Director of Audit (Local 
   Gov) 
Aloysious Manyanja, Director of  
   Project Audit and Administration 
Keto Kayemba, Assistant Director  
   (Central Gov) 
Fixon Okonye Akonya, SPA 
Stephen Kateregga, ADA 
Parliament (Budget Comm) Hon. Beatrice Birungo Kiraso, Chair 
Hon. James Mwandha, Vice Chair 
Parliament (LAAC) Hon. Sarah Nansubuga Nyombi, Chair 
   APNAC 
Hon. Yeri Ofwano Apollo, Deputy 
   Chair 
Hon. Betty Amongi, member of  
   APNAC 
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Author and State Enterprises 
Hon. Julia Lukumu Bintu, Deputy Chair 
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   Director Education and Prevention of 
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Directorate for Ethics and Integrity, Office of 
the President 
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Paul Beggan, DFID, Governance  
   Advisor 
Bank of Uganda Dr. Polycarp Musinguzi, Economic  
   Advisor  
Juma Yusuf K. Walusimbi, Director,  
   Public Relations 
Donors/NGOs/Academics/CSOs  
Sida Gloria Kempaka Mugabe, Economist 
Danida Daniel S. Iga, Program Officer 
Lotte Mindedal, Counselor  
   (development) 
Norad Morten Heide, 1st Secretary (Country  
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   Economist) 
Sam Kajoba, Program Officer 
Royal Netherlands Embassy Warner ten Kate, 1st Secretary,  
   (Macroeconomist) 
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Makerere University Dr. Emmanuel Kasimbazi, Acting Dean, 
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Dr. Julius Kiiza, Department of Political 
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